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MILITARY SERVICE AND PRIVATE PENSION PLAN
BENEFITS: AN ANALYSIS OF VETERANS'
REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
In 1940, Congress enacted the Selective Training and Service Act'
which created this nation's first peacetime draft. 2 Not only did the 1940
Act initiate peacetime conscription, but it also differed from previous
selective service acts in its careful attention to the disruptive effects to
be expected from subsequent demobilization. 3 In order to prevent
widespread unemployment like that which had followed World War I,4
the Act provided for reemployment rights of veterans inducted after
May 1, 1940.5 Specifically, the 1940 Act established a legally enforcea-
ble right to full reemployment 6 concomitant with the duty to render
compulsory military service.7
Section 8(b) of the Act provided that a qualifying veteran 8 was to
be restored to the position he had held prior to his military service "or
to a position of like seniority, status, and pay."9 Any veteran so re-
stored was, under section 8(c), to be "considered as having been on
furlough or leave of absence" from his job during the period of his
military service; and, he was to be "so restored without loss of senior-
ity" and "entitled to participate in insurance and other benefits offered
by the employer" on the same basis as non-veteran employees on fur-
l. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 [hereinafter referred to as
the Act or the 1940 Act].
2. J. DUGGAN, THE LEGISLATIVE AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL CON-
CEPT OF CONSCRIPTION FOR MILITARY SERVICE at 93-97 (1946) [hereinafter referred to as
DUGGAN].
3. See Haggard, Veterans' Reemployment Rights and the "Escalator Principle," 51 B.U.L.
REV. 539, 539-40 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Haggard]; Andrews, Reemployment and Postwar
Planning, 220 ANNALS 186, 187 (1942) [hereinafter referred to as Andrews]; Comment, Veterans'
Reemployment Rights Under Selective Service Interpretations, 54 YALE L.J. 417, 417-18 (1945)
[hereinafter referred to as Selective Service Interpretations].
4. Haggard, supra note 3, at 539; Andrews, supra note 3, at 187-89; Selective Service Interpre-
tations, supra note 3, at 417-20.
5. 1940 Act, ch. 720, § 8, 54 Stat. 890.
6. The Act establishes a civil cause of action and provides for the assistance of a United
States attorney who can bring an action on behalf of a veteran against an employer who refuses to
comply with the reemployment rights provisions. 1940 Act, ch. 720, § 8(c), 54 Stat. 891. See 28
C.F.R. § 50.45(h) (1980)..
7. 1940 Act, ch. 720, § 8, 54 Stat. 890; see DUOGAN, supra note 2, at 100-02.
8. Any veteran who left a permanent position in order to serve in the armed forces and who
(i) satisfactorily completed his tour of duty; (ii) was still able to perform the duties of his prior
position; and (iii) made application for reemployment within 40 days of discharge was a "quali-
fied" veteran. 1940 Act, ch. 720, § 8(b), 54 Stat. 890. The period required for application for
reemployment was later extended to 90 days. Act of Dec. 8, 1944, Pub. L. No. 473, 58 Stat. 798.
9. 1940 Act, ch. 720, § 8(b), 54 Stat. 890.
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lough or leave of absence.10 Section 8 thus provided a program for
easing previously employed veterans back into civilian life: it insured
their reemployment; restored their seniority, job status and level of pay;
and preserved their fringe benefits which had accrued prior to military
service.
The language of section 8(b) clearly conveys Congress' intent to
restore the returning veteran to the same job he held before induction
or to one substantially like it." By contrast, the language of section
8(c)' 2 leaves ambiguous the relative priority of veterans' reemployment
rights and of the rights of employers and employees to determine policy
pertaining to furlough or leave of absence. For purposes of section
8(c), a veteran who is restored to his prior job in accordance with sec-
tion 8(b) is deemed to have been on furlough or leave of absence dur-
ing the time he spent in military service.13 Notwithstanding such
status, section 8(c) provides that the veteran shall be restored "without
loss of seniority."14 A conflict arises between these provisions when an
employment or collective bargaining agreement defines "seniority" so
as to exclude periods of furlough or leave of absence. In such a case, it
is clear that the statute restores seniority accumulated prior to induc-
tion; however, it is not altogether clear that the statute supersedes em-
10. Id
1I. Section 8(b) provides:
(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and
service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ of
any employer and who (1) receives such certificate, (2) is still qualified to perform the
duties of such position, and (3) makes application for reemployment within forty days
after he is relieved from such training and service-
(A) if such position was in the employ of the United States Government, its
Territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia, such person shall be restored
to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay;
(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such employer
shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like seniority, status,
and pay unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossi-
ble or unreasonable to do so;
(C) if such position was in the employ of any State or political subdivision
thereof, it is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress that such person should
be restored to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay.
1940 Act, ch. 720, § 8(b), 54 Stat. 890.
12. Section 8(c) provides:
(c) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having been on furlough or
leave of absence during his period of training and service in the land or naval forces,
shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance
or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices
relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the
time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall not be discharged from such
position without cause within one year after such restoration.
1940 Act, ch. 720, § 8(c), 54 Stat. 890.
13. Id
14. Id
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ployment or collective bargaining agreements and creates seniority that
would not have otherwise accumulated during a furlough or leave of
absence. In 1945, the United States Supreme Court settled this "senior-
ity" problem in favor of the veteran, construing section 8(c) as guaran-
teeing the accumulation of seniority during military service regardless
of company or union policy about furlough or leave of absence. 5
Section 8(c) further provides that the returning veteran has a right
"to participate in insurance and other benefits" offered by his employer
on the basis of "established rules and practices relating to employees on
furlough or leave of absence."' 6 Thus, the statute defers to the rules
and practices of the employer concerning a veteran's participation in
fringe benefit programs.' 7 That is, the veteran's military service is
equated with a furlough or leave of absence and his rights to "insur-
ance and other benefits" are determined by reference to the employer's
rules and practices.
Thus, the 1940 Act accords quite different treatment to "seniority"
than it does to "insurance and other benefits": an employer must com-
pletely restore a reemployed veteran's seniority but it need only pro-
vide insurance and other benefits insofar as it does for employees on
furlough or leave of absence. This disparate statutory treatment can
present problems in determining a returning veteran's fringe benefits
which are based on an employee's years of service with an employer. If
a particular fringe benefit is characterized as an "incident of seniority,"
then the Act would require that an employer give the returning veteran
full credit for his military service. By contrast, inclusion of a service-
related fringe benefit under the classification of "insurance and other
benefits" results in a denial of credit for military service and a conse-
quent reduction in benefits if the employer legitimately excludes credit
for periods of furlough or leave of absence. In the area of private pen-
sion plans, this problem becomes particularly acute because such plans
usually calculate benefits using a formula which recognizes an em-
ployee's years of continuous service with an employer.' 8 Unfortu-
nately, the 1940 Act does not specify or characterize the types of
15. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284-85 (1946). This princi-
ple was later approved by Congress and enacted as § 9(c)(2) of the Selective Service Act of 1948.
Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 9(c)(2), 62 Stat. 604, 615-16 [hereinafter referred to as
1948 Act]. See also Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169, 174-75 (1964). See generally
Haggard, supra note 3.
16. 1940 Act, ch. 720, § 8(c), 54 Stat. at 890.
17. See Haggard, supra note 3, at 567-68.
18. See generally D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 101-09 (4th ed. 1979)
[hereinafter referred to as McGILL].
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benefits which are to be included under the classification "insurance
and other benefits."
The relationship between veterans' reemployment rights and the
crediting of military service toward private pension plan benefits will
be the focus of this note. In particular, this note will trace the statutory
and case law development of the veteran's reemployment rights provi-
sions since the 1940 Act and examine how they were applied in two
recent United States Supreme Court decisions in the area of private
plan benefits. In both Alabama Power Co. v. Davis19 and Coffy v. Re-
public Steel Corp. ,20 the Court characterized the employee benefits 2' as
incidents or "perquisites of seniority,' 22 rather than as a type of "insur-
ance and other benefits." Consequently, the calculation of each vet-
eran's benefit accruals had to include periods of military service, 23 even
though such service was specifically excluded under the terms of the
respective plans. 24 It will be shown that the issues involved in the area
of pension benefits cannot be finally and equitably resolved through
the judicial process but will require congressional action.
IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
It is not possible to determine exactly how many veterans are af-
fected by the recent United States Supreme Court decisions.25 How-
ever, in a news release issued in the wake of Alabama Power Co. v.
Davis, the Department of Labor estimated that "hundreds of
thousands" of veterans could be affected by the decision.26 With the
Supreme Court's extension of the Alabama Power rationale from pen-
19. 431 U.S. 581 (1977).
20. 447 U.S. 191 (1980).
21. Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 582 (1977) (pension plan benefits); Coffy v.
Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 193-94 (1980) (supplemental unemployment benefits).
22. 431 U.S. at 592-94; 447 U.S. at 205-06.
23. 431 U.S. at 594; 447 U.S. at 205.
24. 431 U.S. at 591; 447 U.S. at 198-99.
25. Correspondence with representatives of various governmental agencies reveals that no
data have been compiled showing information about the lives or job status of veterans prior to
their induction. In a letter to M. D. R. Evans, Department of Sociology, The University of Chi-
cago, Mr. Robert W. Shultz, Director, Reports and Statistics Service, Veterans' Administration,
said that almost no information about the pre-military life of veterans was available. He said that,
to the best of his knowledge, there was no information on job status of inductees prior to entering
military service. He also mentioned that he had checked with the Department of Defense and
several "other veterans agencies" but had obtained no information.
This author contacted the Labor Management Services Administration of the Department of
Labor, which knew of no source for data of this sort.
26. United States Department of Labor News Release 77-679, July 30, 1977, 4 PENSION AND
PROFIT-SHARING (P-H) 135,319. The first sentence of the News Release reads:
Hundreds of thousands of veterans who joined the armed forces after May 1, 1940,
and then returned to their former employers may be affected by a recent U.S. Supreme
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sion benefits to supplemental unemployment benefits in Coffy v. Repub-
lic Steel Corp., the rights of even more veterans were affected.
In general, the recent Supreme Court decisions will apply to any
veteran inducted after May 1, 194027 who returns to service with his
former employer. The veteran must at some time become covered
under a retirement plan which recognizes for purposes of participation,
vesting and benefit accruals a period of time encompassing his military
service. In other words, the veteran need not be covered under the em-
ployer's plan before leaving for the military, nor need the plan even
exist at that time.28 The issue is whether the plan extends credit to non-
veterans for service rendered during the veteran's period of military
service.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT
On September 16, 1940, Congress enacted the Selective Training
and Service Act of 1940.29 Section 8 of that Act provided for reemploy-
ment rights of veterans inducted into the armed forces after May 1,
1940. The 1940 Act was later re-enacted as the Selective Service Act of
1948.30 The 1948 Act re-designated section 8 of the 1940 Act as section
9 but made no substantive change in its provisions. 3' The section 9
reemployment rights provisions again remained unchanged when the
1948 Act was later re-enacted as the Military Selective Service Act of
196732 and were subsequently re-codified without substantive change in
Title IV of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of
1974.33 Thus, all veterans serving in the armed forces since 1940 have
been covered under essentially the same reemployment rights
provisions.
Court decision entitling such veterans to receive full credit under certain company pen-
sion plans for time spent in the armed services.
27. May 1, 1940 is the effective date of the Selected Training and Service Act of 1940. See
note I supra.
28. For example, Alabama Power Co. established its pension plan on July 1, 1944, while
Davis was in the military. However, the plan counted "past service," that is, service prior to the
July 1, 1944 effective date of the plan, in the determination of "accredited service," upon which
plan benefits were based. 431 U.S. at 590.
29. Ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (1940).
30. Ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948).
31. S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1989, 2003.
32. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473, 459 (1970).
33. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026, 2021 (1976).
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The Committee Reports and Congressional Debates
Given the revolutionary nature of peacetime conscription, the
1940 Act was hotly debated before both Houses of Congress agreed to
adopt a compromise measure. 34 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
committee reports and congressional debates relevant to the reemploy-
ment rights provisions are, at best, confused. Under pressure for legis-
lation, Congress apparently paid minimal attention to the mechanics of
reemployment rights,35 which is reflected in the lack of coherence and
detail in the legislative history.
On August 5, 1940, a preliminary version of section 8 was reported
out of committee. The Senate report contained the following statement
of congressional intent:
The Congress, in this bill, has declared as the purpose and intent that
every man who leaves his job to participate in this training and serv-
ice shall be reemployed without loss of seniority or other benefits
upon his return to civil life.36
On August 9, Senator Sheppard, Chairman of the Senate Military Af-
fairs Committee, presented this analysis of section 8:
Section 8 attempts to offer a trainee or Reserve officer on active duty
as much protection with respect to reemployment and retention of
employment benefits as is within reasonable bounds. It attempts to
prevent loss of seniority, accrued employment benefits, including
participation in insurance, pension, bonus, and other beneficial
programs. 37
At least two points worth noting emerge from these passages. The first
is that, as a matter of overriding policy, the reemployment rights provi-
sions of section 8 were intended to preserve or "prevent loss of' senior-
ity and accrued employment benefits. What is lacking, however, is any
indication of whether Congress intended to prevent loss of seniority
and employment benefits accrued only to the point of induction, or
whether it intended that the period of protection would extend through
and including the period of military service. The second point is that
Senator Sheppard's remarks signal a distinction between the treatment
accorded "seniority" as opposed to "other benefits." The latter include
"accrued employment benefits" such as "participation in insurance,
34. See DUGGAN, supra note 2, at 95-97.
35. U.S. SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LEGAL GUIDE AND CASE DIGEST OF
VETERANS' REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 889 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as DOL LEGAL GUIDE).
36. S. REP. No. 2002, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940), reprinted in 2 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYS-
TEM, THE SELECTIVE ACT: ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AMENDMENTS, APPROPRIATIONS, COG-
NATES AND PRIOR INSTRUMENTS OF SECURITY, SPECIAL MONOGRAPH No. 2 at 547 (1954)
[hereinafter referred to as 2 SELECTIVE SERVICE MONOGRAPH No. 2).
37. 86 CONG. REC. 10095 (1940).
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pension, bonus" as well as "other beneficial programs." Apparently,
the drafters of section 8 thought of pension benefits, along with insur-
ance benefits, under the same general category of "employment bene-
fits" and not as a sub-category of "seniority."
The version of section 8(c) to which Senator Sheppard here refers
did not yet contain the troublesome "furlough or leave of absence"
clause; it provided merely that any person restored to his prior position
was to be "restored without loss of seniority, insurance participation or
benefits, or other benefits. ' 38 Therefore, at this point in the evolution
of the bill, section 8(c) treated "seniority" identically with "insurance
and other benefits;" both were to be restored fully to the returning
veteran.
The different treatment accorded seniority as opposed to insurance
and other benefits arose from discussion on the Senate floor. During
Senate debate, Senator Danaher asked Senator Sheppard whether, with
respect to "insurance participation or benefits," "someone else" was to
reimburse the "employer's reserve fund" by the "amount of contribu-
tion" that an employee would have paid into the fund had he not been
serving in the armed forces.39 Senator Sheppard replied that section
8(c) referred only to "the benefits" to which the veteran "was entitled
up to the time he left his employment, ' 40 and did not apply "to the time
when he was absent in the service."'4' Insofar as insurance was con-
cerned, then, it was intended that the benefits accrued to time of depar-
ture for the military would be restored but with no further accruals for
time spent in the military. Senator Sheppard then accepted an amend-
38. Id at 10107.
39. The Senate debate, in relevant part, reads as follows:
Mr. DANAHER. [LIet me ask if it is the understanding of the Senator that, under the
clause providing that the conscriptee shall be restored without loss of insurance partici-
pation or benefits, that someone else is going to make up somehow to, let us say, the
employer's reserve fund the amount of contribution which the particular employee for-
merly paid into that fund?
Mr. SHEPPARD. That provision refers solely to the benefits to which he was entitled
up to the time he left his employment. It does not apply to the time when he was absent
in the service.
Mr. DANAHER. But when the bill provides that he shall be restored without loss of
insurance participation or benefits, or other benefits, is it meant by that that if a man
goes out to serve his country under this conscription plan and comes back he assumes his
prior status less I year's payment?
Mr. SHEPPARD. That is what this bill intends, as I understand. That is what the
members of the committee thought should be and could be done.




40. Id at 10107.
41. Id
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ment to section 8(c) which "would make certain that all trainees would
receive the same insurance and other benefits as those who are on fur-
lough or leave of absence in private life."' 42 Except for some minor
changes in language, the Senate version of section 8(c) was complete.
Discussions in the House of Representatives centered on the "job
protection" aspects of the bill, focusing on issues of "seniority" almost
to the exclusion of those pertaining to the "other benefits" clause.43
Representative May, for example, declared that the "chief purpose" of
the final amendment to section 8(c) was to preserve the seniority rights
and privileges of railroad workers. 44
When the provision relating to participation in insurance was con-
sidered, the House, like the Senate, concluded that the employer's prac-
tices with respect to furloughed employees would control.4 5 Section
42. The amendment substituted the following language:
(c) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered during the period of service in
such forces as on furlough or leave of absence; and shall be so restored without loss of
seniority; and shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the
employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough
or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time of being inducted into such
forces; and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within 1 year after
such restoration.
Id at 10914.
43. See generally 2 SELECTIVE SERVICE MONOGRAPH No. 2, supra note 36, at 567-87. See
also Haggard, supra note 3, at 542 n.27.
44. The House debate reads in relevant part:
Mr. MAY. Mr. Chairman, I offer a committee amendment which is at the desk.
The Clerk read as follows:
"(e) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered during the period of service in
such forces as on furlough or leave of absence; and shall be so restored without loss of
seniority; and shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the
employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough
or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time of being inducted into such
forces; and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within I year after
such restoration."
Mr. HARNESS. It certainly is not the intention of the committee that, if this amend-
ment should become law, an employer must continue to pay the social security and other
taxes on that employee's wages while he is no longer working?
Mr. MAY. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of fact, when a man is disconnected from the
service of an employer, the employer is no longer charged with social-security taxes.
There would be none to pay. His social-security tax rests upon earnings.
I may say that the chief purpose of the amendment is to preserve the seniority rights
of the thousands and hundreds of thousands of railroad employees of that character who
have certain seniority privileges on the railroads. In other words, we put them on fur-
lough during the time they are in service and they will even be permitted to count this
time on the question of retirement.
86 CONG. REC. 11702 (1940).
45. The House discussion went as follows:
Mr. MILLER. In reference to insurance, will that apply to group insurance? Many
industrial plants, of course, carry group insurance. Under those contracts they continue
VETS' REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
8(c), it was determined, would not override contractual restrictions in
insurance policies which waived coverage of employees in military
service. 46  It was a matter for the individual employer to decide
whether to continue coverage or pay premiums for inductees.
As far as the "other benefits" language is concerned, the floor de-
bates were unenlightening. The term "other benefits" was apparently
intended to cover all the "rights" a veteran had by virtue of his employ-
ment relationship; that is, all the benefits an employer provided to his
employees. 47 Just what those rights and benefits are cannot be dis-
cerned from the recorded material.
In drafting section 8(c), Congress apparently intended to guaran-
tee veterans returning to their prior jobs full reemployment and resto-
ration of seniority. However, it might also be inferred that Congress
their participation while a man is on vacation or on furlough. Would they continue
those policies in force?
Mr. MAY. This would continue them in force and that is the very purpose of the
legislation.
Mr. MILLER. Some of these group-insurance contracts now carry a restriction on
occupation and some few carry a restriction on military service. Assuming a man has a
group policy with an employee for $5,000, which is not unusual, and that policy carries a
restriction or waiver during a period of war service?
Mr. MAY. Military service?
Mr. MILLER. They are writing that into policies and have been for 3 months.
Mr. MAY. I do not think it would protect any employee against that provision,
because it is a provision within a contract, but the employer might waive it if he wished
to and pay it anyway.
Mr. MILLER. I wanted to get that matter in the RECORD.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment offered by the gen-
tleman from Kentucky [Mr. MAY].
The committee amendment was agreed to.
Id
46. Id
47. In discussing "Amendment No. 15," which provided, in relevant part, for restoration
without loss of "seniority, insurance participation or benefits, or other benefits," it became clear
that no one knew what the "other benefits" term meant. The pertinent discussion follows:
[MR. HARNESS]. We all know what it means when we say, "Without loss of senior-
ity." We know what it means to say without loss of insurance participation, but what
does it mean when it refers to other benefits? Does that mean that the employer during
the year that this man is in the service must continue to pay his social security tax, his
unemployment compensation tax and so forth?
Mr. MAY. I do not think it means that. You will find that in amendments num-
bered 12, 13, and 14 the House inserted the word "seniority" relating to a position held
by the guardsman. It is inserted in three places, and provides that he shall be restored to
his seniority status. In other words, if a man is a Civil Service employee in the Govern-
ment of the United States and is called into service, he shall be restored on his return to
the senior position he held before he left without losing that seniority position. Likewise,
with a railroad employee, under a system of seniority rights on the railroad that gives the
older men in the service priority over the others, that man when he returns shall be
restored to his seniority position.
Mr. HARNESS. There cannot be any objection on the part of anybody to that. It is
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intended to preserve "accrued employment benefits," 48 such as insur-
the other provision which says, "or other benefits." What do you mean by that? Can
anybody interpret just exactly how far that language will go?
Mr. MAY. The gentleman knows other benefits would cover any of the questions
that arose with reference to his rights.
Mr. HARNESS. His other benefits are social security-
Mr. MAY. Yes.
Mr. HARNESS. Unemployment compensation-
Mr. MAY. Yes.
Mr. HARNESS. And probably many others in the various States where they are em-
ployed by private industry.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, so far as I know, those on the minority side have no
objection to the conference report covering the first 14 amendments. On amendment
number 15 there does seem some question as to the definition of the term "or other
benefits," and what these actually include. It has been brought out in the hearings before
the committee that possibly some amendment to the Social Security Act will have to be
effected in legislation for the benefit of members of the National Guard; in fact, it has
been recommended to the committee by one of the senior National Guard commanding
officers. Whether or not it would be worth while to oppose agreement on this amend-
ment number 15 and instruct the conferees to insist upon an amendment providing for
the deletion of certain words, I do not know. I would be pleased to yield to any Member
in this connection who may care to speak upon it.
Mr. THOMASON. Does the gentleman understand that part of subsection (c) "or
other benefits" includes social security payments?
Mr. ANDREWS. I am not certain as to what the expression "other benefits" does
comprise.
Mr. THOMASON. I do not myself. I am inclined to think it does and I do not know
how else you could provide for it, because would not a man's benefits lapse if somebody
did not keep them up? And if a guardsman who has gone off on a year's training is
unable to pay them, then would the employer keep up those social security benefits until
his return?
Mr. MAY. If I recall it correctly, I think the conferees in the discussion of that
matter also had in mind a case of this kind. A man goes into training with the guard and
he has a house which he bought on the installment plan under the Federal Housing
Administration, we will say, at $30 a month. During the 12 months that he has been in
training, 12 of those payments have accrued and may be unpaid. When he goes into the
court on that question, they can litigate that matter also and determine whether or not
that man's indebtedness might be assumed by the mortgagor or the mortgagee and as
between them, whether it should constitute a lien on the house. Those are some of the
rights involved in the matter.
Mr. HARNESS. That matter will be taken care of under the soldiers and sailors'
civil-rights bill?
Mr. MAY. Certainly.
Mr. HARNESS. Then why is it necessary to complicate this bill by inserting in the
bill these words when nobody knows just what they mean?
Mr. MAY. Well, the phrase "other rights" means any rights that the soldier has.
Mr. HARNESS. Of course, nobody wants to deprive him of any of his rights that he
had at the time he left.
Mr. MAY. We intended to broaden it to protect every right he has.
Mr. HARNESS. By doing that are you not imposing upon industry a burden that you
do not intend to impose?
Mr. MAY. No; we do not think it is a burden upon industry, because they can adjust
those things very easily, and it would be a greater burden upon the individual than it
would be upon industry.
Id at 10761-63.
48. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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ance, pension and bonus programs, but only on a limited basis and in
deference to an employer's policy and practices. The statute links the
terms "insurance" and "other benefits," implying an equal participa-
tion in each type of benefit and identical qualification by the "furlough
or leave of absence" clause.49 In both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, restoration of insurance was guaranteed for the period
preceding induction and did or did not occur for the period of military
service depending on actual employer practices. Seemingly, then, the
"other benefits" provided by the employer should receive the same
treatment.50 However, because of the dearth of relevant information in
the legislative history, administrative agencies and the courts were
forced to define the term "other benefits."
Agency Interpretations of the Statutory Provisions
Under the 1940 Act, the Director of Selective Service was charged
with administering the reemployment rights provisions of the statute. 51
From the beginning, the Director implemented the seniority provisions
of section 8 so as to extend the fullest possible range of protections to
the veteran. Section 8, the Director advised, provided accumulation of
seniority during military service5 2 as well as a system for "special pref-
erence" or "super-seniority," which guaranteed the veteran his prior
job, no matter what the employer's circumstances, for a one-year pe-
riod following reinstatement. 53 There is' no indication, however, that
the Director of Selective Service expressed himself concerning the "in-
surance and other" benefits provisions of section 8.
Administration was subsequently transferred to the Secretary of
Labor who, through the newly-created Bureau of Veterans' Reemploy-
ment Rights, was to provide assistance to veterans seeking reemploy-
ment under the 1948 Act. 54 Prior to the transfer of administration, the
Department of Labor had rejected the "super-seniority" treatment of
49. See note 12 supra.
50. In both the Senate and House discussions of insurance participation and social security
taxes, the congressmen were concerned with the funding of these benefits while the inductee was
absent. In no case was it suggested that involuntary funding of employee benefits be required.
Such an economic burden seemed beyond the limit of the statute's reach. See notes 39, 45 and 47
.5Upra.
51. 1940 Act, ch. 720, § 8(g), 54 Stat. 892.
52. U.S. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, LOCAL BOARD MEMORANDUM No. 190-A, Part IV,
§§ l(c) and (f, May 20, 1944, quotedin 14 L.R.R.M. 2615, 2616 (1945) [hereinafter referred to as
BOARD MEMORANDUM]. See generally Selective Service Interpretations supra note 3. See also
Haggard, supra note 3, at 542.
53. BOARD MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at §§ l(c), (d), and (e); Selective Service Interpreta-
tions, supra note 3; Haggard, supra note 3, at 544-45.
54. 1948 Act, ch. 625, § 9(h), 62 Stat. 616.
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veterans urged by the Director of Selective Service." Subsequently,
the Department interpreted the section 9 provisions56 of the 1948 Act to
provide only restoration of seniority to returning veterans, including
time spent in military service.57 As was the case with the Selective Ad-
ministration, the Department did not then express policy relative to the
non-seniority provisions; however, it did identify "pensions, vacation
pay, automatic promotions, and step-rate increases" as "reemployment
rights."5 8
In 1964, the Solicitor of the Department of Labor published an
extensive "legal guide" to veterans' reemployment rights in general and
the seniority and other benefits provisions in particular.5 9 As for sen-
iority rights, the Department reaffirmed its prior position on reinstate-
ment and provided detailed rules to effect compliance.60 However, for
the "insurance and other benefits" provisions of the statute, the Depart-
ment broke new ground, providing a detailed analysis of the statutory
provision and its legislative history while making sweeping policy
recommendations.6 l
Without the benefit of either congressional examination of this
provision or judicial interpretation of the legislative history, the De-
partment formulated six recommendations for administering the "other
benefits" provision. 62 The most important of these pertained to the
55. Veterans'Rights to Reemployment, 16 L.R.R.M. 2535, 2536 (1945); see Haggard, supra
note 3, at 544 n.42.
56. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
57. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR DEPARTMENT FIELD LETTER No. 7: QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS ON VETERANS' REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS UNDER SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF
1948, reprinted in 23 L.R.R.M. 65 (1949) [hereinafter referred to as QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS]; see
also DOL LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 35, at 689-91.
58. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 57, at 66.
59. DOL LEGAL GUIDE supra note 35.
60. Id at 689-759.
61. Id at 889-926.
62. The six recommendations are:
1. Since the legislative history indicates that the amendments were intended to
provide protection supplementary to that already in the act at the time, in no context
should either the first "furlough or leave of absence" clause or that associated with the
protection of "insurance and other benefits" or both be treated as excluding protection
otherwise afforded by the act or as defining a ceiling on rights; the furlough or leave
provisions must be considered further assurance, a floor of protection for "insurance and
other benefits."
2. The specific statutory protections for "seniority," "status" and "pay" of (b) and
(c)(l), as in U.M.T.S.A. specifically defined in (c)(2) afford protection for rights, regard-
less of their description, to the extent that those rights are conditioned on, measured by
or have the character of those components of "position."
3. Only insurance rights and insurance-type retirement systems should be consid-
ered as included in "insurance and other benefits."
4. The second "furlough or leave of absence" provision can have no application to
any right or benefit, the contractual basis of which was created after the employee left for
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problematic "furlough or leave of absence" clause, which appears twice
in section 8(c). 63 The first "furlough or leave of absence" clause was
interpreted as merely descriptive of the status of inductees-that is, as a
means of describing the fact that induction does not sever the employ-
ment relationship and that inductees do not lose seniority and other
benefits. 64 The second clause is, in effect, a limitation on a veteran's
participation in insurance and other benefits. 65
Even though the Department had correctly identified the differ-
ence between the two "furlough or leave of absence" clauses, it never-
theless refused to read either of them as "excluding protection"
provided elsewhere in the Act or as "defining a ceiling on rights." 66
Consequently, the practical effect of the Department's ruling was that it
interpreted away the limiting effect of the second clause in certain cir-
cumstances. If, for example, the amount of an insured death benefit is
related to years of service performed, then a conflict between the two
clauses can arise. The first "furlough or leave of absence" clause re-
quires restoration of seniority with the employer plus accumulation for
military service, whereas the second could exclude the military service
from seniority provided that it also did so uniformly for employees on
furlough or leave of absence. The Department interpretation, however,
requires that, because the first clause restores the military service, the
second cannot then exclude it. Of course, this problem also arises in
the context of pension plans where benefit amounts often depend heav-
ily on the length of service performed.
The Department's view incorrectly assumes that there is but one
meaning of "seniority," forever fixed and determined. On the contrary,
definitions of the term vary according to the context or the rights in-
volved. What has been called "competitive status seniority" ranks an
employee relative to others and applies to such rights as promotion,
military service or was inducted, a fortiori to any such right for which the contractual
basis was created after his return from service.
5. The application of either or both "furlough or leave" clauses should be based on
some clear interpretation of their statutory purpose and limitations and not in disregard
of their differences, and without consideration of their applicability to the facts.
6. Since the protections were intended to operate as additions and since the statute,
liberally interpreted, makes them a floor under rights, it would seem that where lack of
uniformity exists in the employer's dealings with employees on furlough and those on
leave of absence, ex-servicemen may not receive worse treatment than employees on
furlough as a group, or than employees on contractual leaves, viewed as a separate
group.
Id at 890-91 (references omitted).
63. See note 12 supra.
64. Id at 905-06.
65. Id at 906-07.
66. See recommendation No. 1 supra note 62.
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transfer and order of recall. "Benefit seniority," on the other hand, de-
termines each employee's length of service for purposes of determining
severance pay allowance, pension benefits and supplemental unem-
ployment benefits. 67 In terms of the Act, the seniority provisions com-
pletely restore "competitive status seniority" while allowing for
limitations on benefit accruals by employing "benefit seniority." Seen
in this light, there is no inconsistency with the statute, and employer
practices are given due weight. By contrast, the Department's interpre-
tation effectively creates a new brand of "super-seniority" which over-
rides the legitimate practices and policies of employers in fashioning an
employee benefit program.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS PROVISIONS
In interpreting and applying reemployment rights provisions, the
United States Supreme Court has confronted two kinds of issues:
whether an alleged seniority right or privilege falls within the purview
of the Act and whether a specific right or benefit should be character-
ized as an instance of "seniority" or as a type of "insurance and other
benefit." Each issue requires a different method of analysis for its reso-
lution. In the first type of issue, the Court has focused on aspects of
seniority and has explored the breadth of the statutory protections. In
the second and more difficult type of case, the Court has had to start
with the right or benefit, fit it within the suitable category of "senior-
ity" or "insurance and other benefits" and then apply the appropriate
statutory guarantee.
Fishgold and Its Progeny. Seniority and the "'Escalator Principle"
The Supreme Court first considered the seniority provisions of the
1940 Act in the landmark case of Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Corp. 68 Fishgold worked as a welder with Sullivan Drydock until he
was inducted into the army. Upon his discharge after a year of service,
Fishgold was still able to perform the duties of a welder. He reapplied
within the statutory period and was reemployed as a welder.69 When
work slowed early the next year, Fishgold was laid off while non-veter-
ans with more seniority were allowed to work.70 The non-veterans
were retained because, according to the collective bargaining agree-
67. S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 104-15 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as SLICHTER, HEALY & LIVERNASH].
68. 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
69. Id at 277-78.
70. Id at 279.
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ment, shop seniority was to be the controlling factor in lay-off decisions
when, as here, employees had the same or similar skills.71
Fishgold's shop seniority was not an issue because the collective
bargaining agreement required inclusion of Fishgold's military service
in his seniority "as if he were actually and continuously employed by
the company. ' 72 Instead, Fishgold claimed that the company had vio-
lated section 8(c) of the Act when it "discharged" him within one year
of reemployment. 73 The Court concluded, however, that, for purposes
of the Act, Fishgold's lay-off was more like a "furlough" than it was a
"discharge" 74 and nowhere did the Act guarantee a veteran the "right
to work."
'75
Despite the benefit of a liberal construction, the Court could not
find Fishgold's lay-off to be a discharge in violation of section 8(c). A
lay-off, like the statutory "furlough" or "leave of absence," implies a
continuing employment relationship with the right to return to work
under specified conditions. A discharge, on the other hand, implies a
complete termination or cessation of the employment relationship. 76 In
the face of contrary administrative rulings,77 the Court construed "lay-
off" as akin to a "furlough" or "leave of absence. 78  Finding no "dis-
charge," the Court decided that no section 8(c) violation had
occurred. 79
The narrow holding in Fishgold belies the central importance of
the case. In dicta, the Court established three principles that have set
the tone and structured the issues in all subsequent reemployment
rights cases. The first principle-and the one closest to the holding in
the case-is that the Act does not provide a right to "super-seniority"
71. The collective bargaining agreement provided that:
Promotions and reclassifications and increases or decreases in the working force
shall be based upon length of service and ability to do the job. Wherever between two or
more men, ability is fairly equal, length of service shall be the controlling factor.
Id
72. Id at 279 n.2.
73. Id at 280, 285. See note 78 infra.
74. Id at 287.
75. Id at 289.
76. Id at 287. The Director of Selective Service had ruled that the Act required reinstate-
ment of a veteran even though a non-veteran might have to be discharged. BOARD MEMORAN-
DUm, supra note 52, at § 1(c). See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
77. 328 U.S. at 287.
78. The Court noted the Selective Service's interpretation of § 8 in its Local Board Memo-
randum No. 190-A which, in effect, gave the veteran a right to "super-seniority." See notes 51 &
52 and accompanying text supra. Such a right would have guaranteed Fishgold his welder's job
for one year despite his shop seniority. The Court, however, declined to follow the Service's
interpretation in the absence of a clearer indication by Congress of its acceptance of such interpre-
tation. 328 U.S. at 289-91. See also Haggard, supra note 3, at 544-45.
79. 328 U.S. at 287.
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for the statutory one-year period following a veteran's reinstatement. 80
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, noted that the Act guarantees
that the veteran will not be penalized by his military service,8' but it
does not give him an increase in seniority over what he would have
accumulated had he been continuously employed. 82 The Act, he said,
sought to protect the veteran within the framework of existing seniority
systems, but it did not mean to give the veteran preferential treatment
over and above that accorded by his "restored" shop seniority.83 Sim-
ply put, the Act does not guarantee the veteran a "right to work."84
The second major principle is that the Act is to be construed liber-
ally for the benefit of the returning veteran. A liberal construction of
the Act requires that practices of employers or agreements between em-
ployers and unions cannot operate so as to reduce the benefits guaran-
teed veterans by the Act. 85
The most famous of the three Fishgold principles is Justice Doug-
las' "escalator principle"8 6 which interprets the section 8(c) provision
that a returning veteran shall be restored to his former position "with-
out loss of seniority. 87 Clearing up inconsistencies between provisions
80. See Haggard, supra note 3, at 544-57; Note, "Superseniority"for Returning Veterans, 35
GEO. L.J. 250 (1947); Note, The Reemployment Provisions ofthe Selective Service Act, 5 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 48, 63 (1948).
81. 328 U.S. at 284.
82. Id at 285-86.
83. Id at 288.
84. Id at 289.
85. Id at 285.
86. Justice Douglas expressed the "escalator principle" in three ways:
Thus, [the veteran] does not step back on the seniority escalator at the point he
stepped off. He steps back on at the precise point he would have occupied had he kept
his position continuously during the war.
Id at 284-85.
[T]hese provisions guarantee the veteran against loss of position or loss of seniority
by reason of his absence. He acquires not only the same seniority he had; his service in
the armed forces is counted as service in the plant so that he does not lose ground by
reason of his absence.
Id at 285.
The "position" to which the veteran is restored is the "position" which he left plus
cumulated seniority.
Id at 287.
Accord, Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1947). See Sherman, Seniority and
Promotion Rights of Reemployed Veterans, 17 U. Pirr. L. REV. 20, 21-22 (1955). See also Oakley
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 338 U.S. 278, 283 (1949) where the Court said that the returning veteran is
entitled to "a position which, on the moving escalator of terms and conditions affecting that par-
ticular employment, would be comparable to the position which he would have held if he had
remained continuously in his civilian employment."
The "escalator principle" was later approved by Congress and enacted as § 9(c)(2) of the 1948
Act, ch. 625, § 9(c)(2), 62 Stat. 615-16. See Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169, 174-75
(1963).
87. 328 U.S. at 284.
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in the statute,88 Douglas stated that the veteran steps back on the sen-
iority escalator at the point he would have occupied had he kept his
position continuously during the war, not at the point he stepped off
when he went to war.8 9 The section 8(c) provision therefore serves to
protect the veteran against loss of position or loss of seniority by count-
ing his time in the service as time in the plant. Thus, the veteran is
guaranteed his seniority accrued prior to induction plus accumulated
seniority for his period of military service.90
In McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad,9' the Court lim-
ited the application of the escalator principle to incidents of seniority
that accrue automatically and on the basis of seniority alone. Striking
a tone similar to that in Fishgold, the Court in McKinney noted that the
Act does not give the returning veteran a job status above what he
could have achieved merely by continuing his civilian employment.
The Act's purpose, the Court said, is limited to preserving those
"changes and advancements in status that would necessarily have ac-
crued simply by virtue of continued employment .. *"92 The reem-
ployment rights provisions do not guarantee a "perfect reproduction"
of civilian employment, especially when advancement requires discre-
tionary action on the part of the employer.93
In McKinney, promotion under the collective bargaining agree-
ment depended not only on seniority, but also on "fitness and ability"
and the exercise of "discriminating managerial choice."' 94 The Court
reasoned that the element of employer discretion coupled with the re-
quirement of "fitness and ability" tied a contingency to the act of pro-
motion that prevented automatic progression from one job level to
another. 95 Thus, if McKinney had remained continuously employed
during the period of his military service, he still might not have been
promoted. Because promotion did not follow necessarily from McKin-
ney's restored seniority, he was not entitled to the higher position as an
incident of seniority protected by the seniority rights provisions of the
Act. 96
The Court in Tilton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad97 developed a
88. See Haggard, supra note 3, at 541-44.
89. 328 U.S. at 284-85.
90. ld at 287.
91. 357 U.S. 265 (1958).
92. Id at 272 (emphasis added).
93. Id at 271-72.
94. Id at 272.
95. Id at 272-73.
96. Id at 273-74.
97. 376 U.S. 169 (1964).
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"reasonable certainty" test for determining whether a "contingency"
would completely defeat a veteran's claim for incidental seniority
rights. Under this test, a veteran's claim will be supported "if, as a
matter of foresight, it was reasonably certain that advancement would
have occurred, and if, as a matter of hindsight, it did in fact occur.198
The petitioners in Tilton were inducted before having completed
the requisite probationary period for an upgraded position. Upon dis-
charge, petitioners were restored to the upgraded position and were al-
lowed to complete the probationary period. Because seniority was
measured from the date of completion of the probationary period, peti-
tioners were junior to non-veterans who had been upgraded after them,
but who had been able to complete the probationary period while peti-
tioners were in military service.99
The Tilton Court found untenable the lower court's view that peti-
tioners' promotion was not "automatic."' l° The Court reasoned that
petitioners could have completed their probationary period merely by
remaining continuously employed during their period of military serv-
ice. In the absence of employer discretion to deny the promotion once
the requisite probationary period had been completed, the Court found
that the promotion was sufficiently automatic.101
The element of employer discretion distinguishes the decision in
Tilton from that in McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad.10 2 In
McKinney, because advancement depended on the employer's discre-
tionary choice, 0 3 McKinney could not, as a matter of law, show with
reasonable certainty that he would have been promoted merely by his
continued employment.l°4 In Tilton, on the other hand, it was reason-
ably foreseeable that, but for their military service, petitioners would
have completed their probationary period merely by virtue of contin-
98. Id at 181.
99. Id at 172-74. The facts in the case correspond almost exactly with those in Diehl v.
Lehigh Valley R.R., 211 F.2d 95 (1954), rey'dper curiam, 348 U.S. 960 (1955).
100. 376 U.S. at 177. The lower court concluded that promotion was not "automatic" because
it was subject to such variable factors as: "(I) lay offs due to illness or reductions in force, (2) the
continuing unavailability of enough qualified carmen to fill carman's positions, (3) continued sat-
isfactory work by the carman helper in the upgraded position." Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306
F.2d 870, 877 (8th Cir. 1962).
101. 376 U.S. at 177-78. The Tilton Court also found persuasive the fact that under almost
identical circumstances, the veteran's right to promotion was upheld in Diehl v. Lehigh Valley
R.R., 211 F.2d 95 (1954), rev'dper curiam, 348 U.S. 960 (1955). 376 U.S. at 178.
102. 357 U.S. 265 (1958).
103. Id at 272.
104. 376 U.S. at 180.
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ued employment. 0 5
Fishgold0 6 put the returning veteran on the seniority escalator
where, for purposes of seniority, he was treated as having been continu-
ously employed during the period of his military service. In McKin-
ney 10 7 and Tilton, 0 8 the Court broadened the scope of the escalator
principle, applying it not only to "seniority" but also to the rights or
incidents of seniority which accrue to the veteran's credit merely by
virtue of such continuous employment. The "reasonable certainty" test
of Tilton, coupled with the "automatic progression" prerequisite of Mc-
Kinney, has served as the analytic foundation for a number of decisions
concerning the seniority provisions of the Act. '0 9
The Accardi Case. A Testfor Finding "Seniority" or "Other Benefits"
In applying the reemployment rights provisions, the courts have
sometimes been confronted with the preliminary problem of character-
izing a given right or benefit. As the early decisions demonstrate, the
courts had not used a clear-cut test for determining whether a contested
benefit was an element of "seniority" or a type of "other benefit." For
guidance, the courts looked to the legislative history" 0 or simply classi-
fied a benefit as "other" only if it could not be regarded as a type of
105. Id at 181. The Tifton Court concluded that such "variables" as were deemed significant
by the court of appeals were too tenuous to defeat the veteran's claim:
In every veteran seniority case the possibility exists that work of the particular type
might not have been available; that the veteran would not have worked satisfactonly
during the period of his absence; that he might not have elected to accept the higher
position, or that sickness might have prevented him from continuing his employment. In
light of the purpose and history of this statute, however, we cannot assume that Congress
intended possibilities of this sort to defeat the veteran's seniority rights.
Id at 180-8 1. The test is one of "reasonable certainty," not "absolute certainty." Id See note 100
supra .
106. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
107. McKinney v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 357 U.S. 265 (1958).
108. Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169 (1964).
109. See, e.g., Pomrening v. United Air Lines, Inc., 448 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1971) (retroactive
pilot's seniority); Montgomery v. Southern Elec. Steel Co., 410 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1969) (retroac-
tive departmental seniority); Hatton v. Tabard Press Corp., 406 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1969) (promo-
tion); Collins v. Weirton Steel Co., 398 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1968) (advancement); Thomas v. Pacific
N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 434 F. Supp. 741 (D. Or. 1977) (advancement); Chernoff v. Pandick Press,
Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (promotion); McArthur v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 405 F.
Supp. 158 (S.D. Ill. 1975) (retroactive seniority; upgraded position).
110. One court included vacation benefits under Senator Sheppard's category "accrued em-
ployment benefits" rather than his category "seniority":
Vacation advantages accorded employees are certainly no less to be prized than
such benefits as pensions, bonuses, and participation in insurance programs; and the
Congressional history of the. . .Act of 1940 makes it clear that the statute was intended
to protect these other rights.
MacLaughlin v. Union Switch & Signal Co., 166 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1948). See note 37 and
accompanying text supra for discussion of Senator Sheppard's remarks.
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"seniority," "status," or "pay." ''  Generally, the courts had treated
fringe benefits such as vacation or severance pay as "other benefits"" 12
and limited their application to veterans in accordance with employer
regulations and practices with respect to employees on furlough or
leave of absence.' '3
The Supreme Court, in Accardi v. Pennsylvania Railroad,"t4 re-
jected the distinction between "seniority" and "other benefits" that had
been developing in the lower courts. Instead, the Accardi Court ex-
panded the reach of the Fishgold escalator principle to include fringe
benefits" i5 and thus terminated the use of the "other benefits" clause as
a limitation on the benefits of returning veterans.
Petitioners in Accardi worked as tugboat firemen for the railroad
prior to entering the armed services during World War II. Upon dis-
charge, each of the petitioners was restored to his former position of
fireman and received credit toward his seniority for the period of his
military service. Subsequently, the company abolished the position of
"fireman" and discharged petitioners in accordance with an agreement
worked out with the unions involved. The petitioners each received a
I 1I. Another court put vacation pay in the category of "other benefits" because it did not fit
elsewhere:
While the problem of construction is difficult, it seems most likely that the expres-
sion "insurance or other benefits" was meant to cover a fairly narrow group of economic
advantages whose common quality was that they were miscellaneous fringe benefits not
usually regarded as part of "pay," "status," or "seniority." Vacation pay is of this fringe
character ..
Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1957).
112. Alvado v. General Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 983 (1956)
(vacation pay is "other benefit"); Brown v. Watt Car & Wheel Co., 182 F.2d 570 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 875 (1950) (vacation pay); Dougherty v. General Motors Corp., 176 F.2d 561 (3d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 956 (1950) (vacation pay based on gross earnings); Seattle Star,
Inc. v. Randolph, 168 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1948) (severance pay excluded as "furlough or leave of
absence"); Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1948) (vacation pay is "other benefit");
Siaskiewicz v. General Elec. Co., 166 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1948) (vacation pay is "other benefit");
Monticue v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 91 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (vacation pay is "other bene-
fit"); Woods v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 73 F. Supp. 871 (M.D. Pa. 1947) (vacation pay is "other
benefit"). Cf Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957) (wage increase part of seniority,
status or pay). But cf. Mentzel v. Diamond, 167 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1948) (entitled to vacation pay
as if continuously employed).
113. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946) signaled a difference
in treatment accorded seniority as opposed to other benefits. The Court stated that the veteran
"shall be 'restored without loss of seniority' " but that "insurance and other benefits may continue
to accrue to an employee on furlough or leave of absence." Id at 284, 287 (emphasis added). See
Note, Veterans'Reemployment Rights Reexamined-New Labels or a New Approach, 22 HASTINGS
L.J. 375, 385-86 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Reemployment Rights Reexamined]; Note, The
Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 142 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as The Supreme
Court, 1965 Term].
114. 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
115. See note 112 supra and cases cited therein. See also The Supreme Court, 1965 Term,
supra note 113, at 148.
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severance or separation allowance which was based on a formula set
out in the collective bargaining agreement. In computing the amount
of severance allowance, the company excluded the period of time that
petitioners had spent in the military because it was not "compensated
service." Petitioners brought suit claiming a violation of section 8 of
the 1940 Act.116
The railroad claimed that the severance allowances were based not
on "seniority" but on "compensated service" and that, therefore, sec-
tion 8 of the Act was "wholly inapplicable." '17 In response, the Accardi
Court formulated a standard for construing the term "seniority" that
transcends the "narrow, technical definition" of the collective bargain-
ing agreement" 8 and, perhaps, the other provisions of the Act as
well. 19 The Court noted that, while seniority derives its common
meaning from private employment practices, employers and unions
cannot by the use of labels deprive a veteran of his rights under the
Act;' 20 the generally accepted meaning of "seniority" must yield to the
intention of Congress as expressed in the 1940 Act. That intention, the
Court said, is "to preserve for the returning veteran the rights and ben-
efits which would have automatically accrued to them had they re-
mained in private employment rather than responding to the call of
their country."' 2' Thus, the Court reasoned that had the petitioners not
entered the military, they would have completed the appropriate
amount of "compensated service" upon which their severance allow-
ance was based. The Court found that the "real nature" of the sever-
ance allowance was "compensation for loss of jobs" and that the use of
labels such as "compensated service" cannot be used to deprive veter-
ans of a right that Congress clearly intended to preserve. 22
In determining the "real nature" of the severance allowances, the
Court looked to what an employee forfeits by losing his job. Because
rights and benefits accrue to an employee by virtue of his seniority, the
116. 383 U.S. at 227-28.
117. Id at 229.
118. Haggard, supra note 3, at 569-71.
119. The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, supra note 113, at 148.
120. 383 U.S. at 229. Accord, Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285
(1945).
121. 383 U.S. at 229-30. Note the similarity between the Court's language here and that of the
Court in McKinney v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 357 U.S. 265, 272 (1958). It is not clear from
Accardi, however, whether the Court intended to apply the escalator principle only to those fringe
benefits which would "automatically accrue" or to those which are "reasonably certain" to accrue.
Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169 (1964). For a discussion of this issue, see Reemployment
Rights Reexamined, supra note 113, at 388; Comment, Veterans Re-employment Rights Under the
Universal Military Training and Service Act-Seniority Privileges, I GA. L. REV. 293 (1967).
122. 383 U.S. at 230.
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more seniority an employee has, the higher the value of his rights and
benefits and the more he sacrifices when he loses his job. The Court
concluded, therefore, that those employees who terminate their service
with the -most seniority give up the most in rights and benefits; thus,
they should get the highest severance allowances. Furthermore, the re-
quirements of the 1940 Act could only be fulfilled by restoring a vet-
eran's seniority as well as the perquisites and benefits that flow from it.
The severance allowances, the Court said, are "as much a perquisite of
seniority as the more traditional benefits such as work preference and
order of lay-off and recall."' 23 The Court held, therefore, that failure
to credit "compensated service" for the period of military service de-
nied petitioners' right under the Act to be "restored without loss of
seniority."1 24
Consistent with its interpretation of congressional intent, the Ac-
cardi Court construed the "other benefits" clause as "adding certain
protections to the veteran"' 25 rather than as limiting participation in
certain fringe benefit programs. 26 In looking to the legislative history,
the Court approved the government's contention that the clause was
added to the bill "for the express purpose of entitling employees to re-
ceive, while in service, such benefits as their employers accorded em-
ployees on leave of absence."' 27 Nevertheless, the Court refused to
read the "other benefits" clause as a limitation on rights granted the
veteran by the seniority provisions of the Act.128 In the Court's view,
an expanded escalator principle preserves, as a minimum, the rights
and benefits of seniority that would have "automatically accrued" had
the veteran remained in continuous employment during his military
service. In order to identify such "perquisites of seniority," a court
must, afterAccardi, look to the "real nature" of the benefit rather than
to the "narrow, technical" meaning given it in the context of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.' 29
In a subsequent per curiam opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court ex-
123. Id
124. Id at 230-3 1.
125. Id at 231-32.
126. See notes 110-13 and accompanying text supra. See also The Supreme Court, 1965 Term,
supra note 113, at 148.
127. 383 U.S. at 231. See 86 CONG. REC. 11,702 (1940).
128. The Department of Labor has adopted this position in dealing with the "other benefits"
language of the statute. See the DOL recommendations at note 62 supra. See general, DOL
LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 33, at 889-91, 905-09, 917-20; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, VETERANS'
REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS HANDBOOK 59-69, 83-104 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as VETERANS'
HANDBOOK].
129. See Haggard, supra note 3, at 570-71.
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tended the rationale of Accardi further into the area of "other benefits."
In Magma Copper Co. v. Eagar, 30 petitioners sued for vacation and
holiday pay denied them because they were not in service with the
company at the requisite time due to their period of military service.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals easily classified the vacation pay
as a "fringe benefit" which, because it was not an incident of "senior-
ity," "status," or "pay," falls under the category of "other benefits."' 3'
The Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing, distinguishing Ac-
cardi on the grounds that it did not involve a "'fringe benefit' type of
claim" as did petitioners' claim for vacation pay.' 32 The Supreme
Court reversed in a per curiam opinion which cited only Accardi.133
The Court's failure to write an opinion at this important juncture
is curious. Accardi had revolutionized the approach to reemployment
rights cases which had developed in the lower courts by broadening the
scope of the escalator principle and fashioning the "real nature" test for
classifying veterans' rights. Severance pay, and now vacation benefits,
had been re-classified as "perquisites of seniority" and were thus made
subject to the full protections of section 8. After Eagar, then, the
Supreme Court had yet to flesh out the bones of the "real nature" of the
benefit test and determine the application, if any, of the "other bene-
fits" clause.
In his dissent to the denial for rehearing at the appellate level in
Eagar, Judge Madden had astutely noted that, after Accardi, the dis-
tinction between "'seniority, status and pay' on the one hand and
'fringe benefits' on the other does not seem very vital to the Supreme
Court." 34 Nevertheless, Justice Douglas, in his dissent to Eagar,
balked at the Accardi rule that a court must inquire into the "real na-
ture" of the contested benefit in order to determine its proper classifica-
tion. 35 Instead, Douglas applied the sort of analysis that had been
developed by the lower courts in the reemployment rights cases prior to
Accardi: he concluded simply that Accardi was inapposite because it
involved a "seniority problem" whereas Eagar involved a fringe benefit
problem under the "other benefits" clause. 136
130. 380 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'dper curiam, 389 U.S. 323 (1967).
131. 380 F.2d at 320-21. See Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957); Dougherty
v. General Motors Corp., 176 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1949); Siaskiewicz v. General Elec. Co., 166 F.2d
463 (2d Cir. 1948). See also notes 110-12 and accompanying text .supra.
132. 380 F.2d at 321-22.
133. 389 U.S. 323 (1967). See generally Haggard, supra note 3, at 572-76.
134. 380 F.2d at 322 (Madden, J., dissenting).
135. 389 U.S. 323 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
136. Id at 325-26.
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The Supreme Court resolved the brewing conflict in vacation-ben-
efit cases 37 in Foster v. Dravo Corp. 138 Foster took a military leave of
absence after he had been employed for almost a year and a half. He
worked the first seven weeks of 1967, spent eighteen months in the mili-
tary and returned to his job, working the last thirteen weeks of 1968.
The collective bargaining agreement required that employees work a
minimum of twenty-five weeks in each calendar year in order to earn
full vacation benefits. Accordingly, Foster did not receive vacation for
either year.' 39
Foster claimed that he would have earned the vacation had he
been continuously employed during the period of his military service.
Therefore, he felt that he was entitled to vacation benefits for each year
even though he did not fulfill the twenty-five-week work requirement
specified in the collective bargaining agreement.140
The Foster Court distinguished the vacation benefits from the sev-
erance allowance in Accardi because the vacation benefits involve a
substantial work requirement. "Generally," the Court said, "the pres-
ence of a work requirement is strong evidence that the benefit in ques-
tion was intended as a form of compensation." ''4 InAccardi, however,
the use of "compensated service" as a measure of severance pay re-
sulted in a reward for time spent on the payroll instead of as compensa-
tion for work actually performed. 42 Because the "real nature" of the
severance allowance was akin to such "perquisites of seniority" as
"work preference" and "order of lay-off and recall," it was protected by
the seniority provisions of the Act.143 Foster's vacation benefits, how-
ever, more nearly coincided with a form of short-term compensation
for work actually performed. Because Foster did not fulfill the bona
fide work requirement, he was not entitled to the protection of the
statute. 44
Foster did little to resolve the uncertainties in the reemployment
137. See Note, Supplemental Unemployment Benefts." Perquisite of Seniority or Deferred Com-
pensation for Returning Veterans, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 494, 505-07 (1980) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as SUB Benefitsfor Returning Veterans]; Haggard, supra note 3, at 581-82; Reemployment
Rights Reexamined supra note 113, at 390-97.
138. 420 U.S. 92 (1975).
139. Id at 94-95.
140. Id at 95. But see Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225, 229-31 (1966).
141. 420 U.S. at 99.
142. The Court noted that "[t]here would be no distinction whatever between the man who
worked one day a month for seven months and the man who worked 365 days in a year." 383
U.S. at 230.
143. Id at 230-31.
144. 420 U.S. at 99-100.
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rights cases that had followed the decision in Accardi. 145 The escalator
principle, established in Fishgold' s and refined by the "automatic pro-
gression" requirement of McKinney 47 and the "reasonable certainty"
test of Tilton,148 provided a consistent and workable model for issues of
seniority and its incidents. Accardi, and later Eagar,149 blurred the dis-
tinction between "seniority" and "other benefits," substituting the "real
nature" of the benefit test for the "fringe benefit" approach that had
been developing in the lower courts. 50 Unfortunately, Foster failed to
settle this controversy when it made no mention of the "other benefits"
clause while holding that vacation pay was not subject to the protec-
tions of section 8.151 In addition, the Foster Court seemed to deliber-
ately avoid a "real nature" of the benefit analysis, looking instead to
the "common conception" of vacation as a "reward for and respite
from a lengthy period of labor."' 52
REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AND PENSION BENEFITS
When veterans began litigating the status of private pension plan
benefits under the reemployment rights provisions of the Act, there was
no generally accepted standard for classifying benefits which were not
clearly related to seniority. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the
first five cases to raise the issue there was no uniform result: three
courts classified pensions as deferred wages-which are not incidents of
seniority' 53-while two courts classified such benefits as "perquisites of
seniority." 5 4
Deferred Wages or Perquisite of Seniority?
In concluding that pension benefits are, in essence, a form of de-
ferred compensation, three courts have looked to the presence of a
145. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
146. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
147. McKinney v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 357 U.S. 265 (1958).
148. Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169 (1964).
149. Magma Copper Co. v. Eagar, 380 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'dper curiam, 389 U.S. 323
(1967).
150. See notes 110-12 and accompanying text supra. See also Eagar v. Magma Copper Co.,
389 U.S. 323 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
151. Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92 (1975).
152. Id at 101.
153. Jackson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 517 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1975); Litwicki v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974); LaPinta v. Ohio Crankshaft, 90 L.R.R.M.
2929 (N.D. Ohio 1975), vacated and remanded, 559 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1977).
154. Smith v. Industrial Employers & Distrib. Ass'n., 385 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
aft'd, 546 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Alabama Power Co., 383 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Ala.
1974), ajf'dper curiam, 542 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976), aft'd, 431 U.S. 581 (1977).
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"substantial work requirement" as negating the idea of pensions as a
reward for length of service. For example, in Litwicki v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Industries, Inc. ,55 benefits under the pension plan were
based on "continuous service" as defined in the pension agreement.
The pension plan credited continuous service at the rate of one month
for every 135 hours of work. With limited exceptions, 56 the crediting
of continuous service required actual hours of work performed in the
plant. Accordingly, the company withheld credit for Litwicki's volun-
tary tour of duty which was not included in the list of exceptions.
57
The Litwicki court concluded that the "real nature" of the pension
benefits was deferred compensation. It reasoned that continuous serv-
ice under the pension plan was based on a substantial number of hours
of actual work rather than on mere length of time in continuous em-
ployment with the company. 58 The court distinguished Accardi' 59 be-
cause the severance pay at issue in that case had essentially measured
longevity in employment, not actual work performed. 60 Given the
substantial work requirement for continuous service, coupled with the
traditional notion of pension benefits as deferred wages, 161 the Litwicki
court held that pensions were not "perquisites of seniority."'
62
In Jackson v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,163 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals relied on Litwicki in deciding that pension benefits were not
"perquisites of seniority" because they were tied to "actual work
time." 6 Pension benefits in Jackson were based on "credited service"
which, under the plan, meant "active employment" which, in turn, was
defined as "actual work."' 65 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
plan benefits were based on a "substantial work requirement" and, as
such, were not a form of seniority like lay-off, recall and promotion. 
66
The court was persuaded by Litwicki that pension benefits are in fact a
155. 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974).
156. Exceptions included "certain military service, union activity, temporary service in a su-
pervisory or salaried position and, after 1954, jury duty and absence caused by work-related injury
or disease." Id at 191.
157. Id at 190-91.
158. Id at 192-93.
159. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
160. In Accardi, an employee could receive credit for a full year of compensated service by
working only one day a month for seven months. Id at 230.
161. See Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 170 F.2d 247, 248-55 (7th Cir. 1948), aft'd, 339 U.S. 382
(1950); S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1956), quoled in 505 F.2d at 193.
162. 505 F.2d at 192-93.
163. 517 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1975).
164. Id at 1324-26.
165. Id at 1323.
166. Id at 1326.
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form of deferred wages and therefore held that the pensions were not a
"perquisite of seniority."1 67
Finally, the court in Latinta v. Ohio Crankshaft68 found that
credited service under the pension plan was based on a "substantial
work requirement." In order to accrue one year of credited service, an
employee had to work 1,700 hours, or approximately eighty percent of
a normal work year. Such a requirement, the court reasoned, was a
bona fide effort to compensate an employee for work actually per-
formed rather than a device to disguise, by the use of a label, a reward
for length of service. 169
The plaintiff in Lalinta had proposed use of a two-tiered test to
analyze whether the "real nature" of the pension benefit was a "perqui-
site of seniority."' 70 Under the plaintiff's test, the pension benefit, like
the severance allowance in Accardi, is "inherently" a perquisite of sen-
iority and there is therefore no need to look to the collective bargaining
agreement. The court rejected such an approach, reading Foster as re-
quiring an inquiry into the provisions of the agreement in order to de-
termine whether the "true nature" of the benefit is a reward for length
of service or a form of compensation for work performed. The LaPinta
court, like the courts in Litwicki and Jackson, found the presence of a
"substantial work requirement" under the plan which negated the
court's consideration of pension benefits as a "perquisite of
seniority." ' 7
On the other hand, two courts concluded that pension benefits re-
warded longevity in employment rather than actual work performed on
the job. In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Smith v. Industrial Employers and Distributors Association172
followed Accardi in looking beyond the "labels and definitions" to the
"true nature of pension benefits."' 73 That nature, the court deter-
mined, was a right to future benefits governed by the length of an em-
167. Id
168. 90 L.R.R.M. 2929 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
169. Id at 2932.
170. The test, supposedly designed by the United States Supreme Court, is:
The first step is to determine the "real nature" of the benefit. If the benefit by its
real nature inherently is a seniority right, then the inquiry is concluded since the benefit
in question is protected by the Act. On the other hand, if the employee benefit is not
inherently a seniority right, then the focus shifts to the particular formula of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement to determine whether it creates a right based primarily on the
passage of time.
Id at 2931.
171. Id at 2934.
172. 546 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1976).
173. Id at 317-18.
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ployee's service with his employer. 174
The district court in Davis v. Alabama Power Co. 175 employed a
"real nature" analysis of pension benefits and concluded that such ben-
efits "promote personnel stability by giving employees an incentive to
remain with the company."'' 76 The court reasoned that as a reward for
long service, pension benefits should be based on seniority because sen-
iority is the broad measure by which an employee's other major rights
and benefits are determined. Seen in the light of a seniority right, pen-
sion benefits for veterans must include credit for military service to in-
sure "equal competitive status" with non-veterans. 77
In reaching the conclusion that the pension benefit was a reward
for length of service, the Davis court had already determined that pen-
sion benefits under the plan were not based on "units of work." 7 8 Pen-
sion benefits were computed using "accredited service," which is based
on total time of employment as a full-time regular employee of the
company. 79 The court reasoned that pension benefits were therefore
based on "total time of employment," rather than on "units of work"
performed during such "total time of employment."'' 80 Looking be-
yond the labels, the court thus concluded that the computation of pen-
sion benefits was based essentially on seniority which the Act
guaranteed fully to the returning veteran.
The circuits were thus split over the essential characterization of
pension plan benefits. The Accardi case had required an inquiry into
the "real nature" of pension benefits but the courts had not yet settled
on the effect of a "substantial work requirement" on the "real nature"
test. With a split in the circuits and conflicting results in reviews of
essentially similar pension plan provisions, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Alabama Power Co. v. Davis.18'
174. Id at 318.
175. 383 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Ala. 1974), af'dper curiam, 542 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976), aft'd,
431 U.S. 581 (1977).
176. 383 F. Supp. at 888.
177. Id However, the court could have insured Davis' "equal competitive status" merely by
requiring that his military service be counted toward eligibility for and vesting of his pension
benefits. In fact, the court went beyond keeping Davis in "equal competitive status" with nonvet-
erans by requiring that Davis be credited with additional "benefit seniority" as well. See note 67
and accompanying text supra.
178. 383 F. Supp. at 887.
179. Id at 884, 887.
180. Id at 887.
181, 429 U.S. 1037 (1976).
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Alabama Power Co. v. Davis
In Alabama Power Co. v. Davis,182 respondent Davis became a
full-time, permanent employee of Alabama Power Co. on August 16,
1936. He continued to work for the company until March 18, 1943,
when he left to enter the military. 183 After serving thirty months, Davis
resumed his employment with the company on October 8, 1945.184
Alabama Power Co. had established a defined benefit pension
plan' 85 on July 1, 1944, during the time that Davis was in the military.
The plan covers "full-time regular employee[s]" who have completed
one year of continuous service with the company and who have at-
tained age twenty-five. Normal retirement age under the plan is sixty-
five, but a covered employee who has both attained age fifty-five and
completed at least twenty years of "accredited service" may choose
early retirement. In addition, covered employees become fully
vested 86 in their accrued benefits upon either completing at least
twenty years of service or attaining age fifty and completing at least
fifteen years of service. Time spent in military service is included in
"service" for purposes of determining a covered employee's vested ben-
efit under the plan. The plan is funded entirely by Alabama Power Co.
and no contributions are required of employees.187
Pension benefits under the plan are computed according to a
formula which takes into account a covered employee's "monthly earn-
ings" at retirement date188 and his "accredited service."1 89 Accredited
service is the sum of future service, defined as the period of service
from the later of July 1, 1944 and an employee's coverage date under
the plan, and past service, defined as the period of service prior to July
1, 1944, the effective date of the plan. 19° Specifically excluded from
accredited service by the plan are periods of non-compensated leaves of
182. 431 U.S. 581 (1977).
183. Id at 582.
184. Id at 582, 591.
185. A "defined benefit pension plan" is one in which the benefits provided under the plan are
determined in advance by a formula and the contributions to the plan are the variable factor. See
generally MCGILL, supra note 18, at 101-09.
186. "Vesting" refers to the nonforfeitable right of a participant under a qualified retirement
plan to receive his accrued benefits whether or not he remains in service with the employer. Id at
135-39.
187. 431 U.S. at 590.
188. Id at 591 n.15.
189. Id at 590.
190. Id Accredited service was apparently credited for periods of service rendered to the
company as a full-time regular employee. Id at 591. The district court noted that there was no
"unit of work" requirement in the crediting of service. 383 F. Supp. at 884-85, 887.
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absence and military service. 191
Davis selected the early retirement feature and he retired on June
1, 1971. He received accredited service from August 16, 1937, the date
he completed the one-year eligibility requirement for participation
under the plan, to June 1, 1971, his early retirement date. Davis did
not receive credit for the thirty months he spent in military service, in
keeping with the plan's definition of accredited service. Accordingly,
Davis brought suit, claiming that section 9 of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967192 required that Alabama Power Co. count his mili-
tary service toward the determination of his pension benefit. 93
In reviewing the applicable case law, the United States Supreme
Court found two "axes of analysis" used to determine whether a benefit
is a "right of seniority" secured to the veteran by section 9. In the first
of these, a benefit is a "perquisite of seniority" if the benefit would have
accrued with reasonable certainty had the veteran been continuously
employed during the period of his military service and if its "true na-
ture" is a reward for length of service. In the second analysis, if the
benefit is subject to a significant contingency or if it is in the nature of
short-term compensation for services rendered, it is not an incident of
seniority protected by section 9.194
In order to determine whether Davis' pension benefit was an inci-
dent of seniority, the Court looked to the two criteria of the first "axis
of analysis." Applying the reasonable certainty standard from McKin-
ney and Tilton, 195 the Court concluded that, given his work record, Da-
vis would almost certainly have accumulated the additional thirty
months of accredited service denied him by reason of his absence in the
military.196
As for the second criterion, Alabama Power Co. argued that the
pension benefit more nearly resembled the vacation benefits in Fos-
ter197 than it did the severance allowance of Accardi. 198 The company
reasoned that accredited service was defined in terms of "full-time em-
ployment" with the company; therefore, the pension benefits were
191. 431 U.S. at 591.
192. 50 U.S.C. app. 459 (1970). See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
193. 431 U.S. at 582.
194. Id at 584-89.
195. McKinney v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 357 U.S. 265 (1958); Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
376 U.S. 169 (1964). The reasonable certainty standard is met "if, as a matter of foresight, it was
reasonably certain that advancement would have occurred, and if, as a matter of hindsight, it did
in fact occur." Id at 181.
196. 431 U.S. at 591.
197. Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92 (1975).
198. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
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based on a substantial work requirement which evidenced the nature of
the benefits as a form of compensation. 99
The Court looked beyond the "overly simplistic analysis" of Ala-
bama Power Co., finding that the "true nature" of the pension benefit
was a reward for length of service. In reaching that result, the Court
made several observations. First, the Court noted that the lengthy pe-
riod of service required for the vesting of pension benefits indicated
that what mattered was not the service actually performed but the pas-
sage of years in the company's employ. In other words, it would be
difficult to maintain that a pension increment is deferred compensation
for the year in which it was earned if the employee becomes entitled to
that increment only after meeting the lengthy vesting requirement.
Second, the benefit formula that determined the pension benefit was
based on earnings and accredited service as at actual retirement date;
therefore, the amount of the employee's benefit and the cost to the em-
ployer of funding that benefit depended directly on the length of time
that the employee continued to work for the employer. Third, a pen-
sion program promotes long service with an employer by guaranteeing
the employee a measure of financial security. This financial security, in
turn, permits older, less efficient workers to retire, thus opening up jobs
for younger workers. Therefore, the Court concluded, pension pay-
ments are rewards for continuous employment with the same employer.
As such, they are "perquisites of seniority" which warrant the full pro-
tections of the reemployment rights provisions of section 9.200
Analysis of the Decision
With a sweeping generalization, the United States Supreme Court
in Alabama Power Co. v. Davis concluded that "pension payments are
predominantly rewards for continuous employment with the same em-
ployer."20' Nevertheless, the facts and circumstances of the case will
not support such a broad conclusion because the Court did not, in fact,
show that the "true nature" of all pension payments is necessarily a
"reward for length of service" with a single employer. In particular,
the criteria used by the Court in deciding that pension payments re-
ward "continuous employment" do not apply to pension plans gener-
ally, and the Court's "dual axis" analysis202 will not serve well outside
the realm of collectively bargained seniority systems. In essence, then,
199. 431 U.S. at 592.
200. Id at 593-94.
201. Id at 594.
202. Id at 589.
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Alabama Power has little precedential value: the case provides almost
no guidance for resolving problems of veterans' reemployment rights
that might arise in the area of private pension plan benefits, particu-
larly those pertaining to non-union employees.
The Alabama Power Court noted that the long period required for
vesting of pension benefits under the Alabama Power Co. pension plan
was the most significant factor leading to its conclusion that pension
payments are predominantly a reward for length of service. 20 3 The
Court reasoned that a pension accrual is not deferred compensation for
the year in which service is actually rendered if, as here, the right to
receive that pension accrual vests only after a substantial period of con-
tinuous employment. Thus, the Court concluded that the presence of a
substantial vesting requirement implies a reward for continuous em-
ployment with a single employer.20 4
By deciding the case on that basis, the Court has necessarily lim-
ited the "most significant factor" in its decision to actions for private
pension plan benefits commenced prior to 1976. The Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 2 5-which was enacted subsequent
to respondent Davis' retirement--established minimum vesting stan-
dards for private pension plans effective for the first plan year begin-
ning after December 31, 1975.206 Generally speaking, ERISA requires
vesting of accrued benefits within five to fifteen years of service.20 7 In
attempting to discuss the effect of ERISA, the Court noted that the law
was inapplicable to Davis' claim for benefits and, "insofar as is relevant
in this case, does not alter the nature of pension plans. ' 20 8 If, as the
Court presumed, that nature is a "reward for length of service," then,
as a codification of public policy, ERISA does, in fact, alter the nature
of pension plans.
Throughout the legislative history of ERISA, the committee re-
ports identified inadequate vesting as a major problem for retirement
income security.2° 9 As the reports note, substantial vesting require-
203. Id at 593.
204. Id at 593-94. The Alabama Power Co. pension plan provided for vesting of accrued
benefits either after completing 20 years of service or after both attaining age 50 and completing
15 years of service. Id at 590.
205. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as ERISA].
206. 29 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976). See general, McGILL, supra note 18, at 139-42. Comparing the
Alabama Power Co. pension plan's vesting provision with the minimum vesting standards of ER-
ISA, it is clear that the plan's vesting schedule would not qualify under ERISA.
208. 431 U.S. at 590 n.13.
209. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5-6, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4639, 4643-45; H.R. REP. No. 807, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. I, 3, 11-12, reprinted in [1974]
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ments have often resulted in forfeiture of accrued pension benefits de-
spite long periods of service and have interfered with the mobility of
labor to the detriment of the economy. 210 Thus, ERISA mandates min-
imum vesting standards21' and provides for some portability212 of pen-
sion benefits in order to insure retirement income security for an
increasingly mobile workforce. 21 3
Therefore, the Court's focus on the presence of a substantial vest-
ing requirement and its analysis of the function of pension plans as a
reward for length of service 214 run counter to public policy. The trend
to shorten vesting requirements and provide some measure of retire-
ment income security to short service employees undermines the basis
for the Court's conclusion that the "true nature" of pension payments is
a reward for length of service with a single employer. In light of rec-
ommendations by commentators 215 and the President's Commission on
Pension Policy, 216 the trend toward even shorter vesting requirements
and more portability of pension benefits should continue beyond the
minimum standards set by ERISA. Such a trend reveals that, contrary
to the Court's conclusion, the "true nature" of pension benefits is a
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4672, 4679; S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. I, 8-9,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4844-45; S. REP. No. 383, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, 3, 14, 19-20, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4890, 4891, 4901, 4904-07.
210. Id See also McGILL, supra note 18, at 139-43; W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, PENSION
PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 151-75 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as GREENOUGH & KING].
211. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4651-52; H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
18-23, 53-73, reprinted in 11974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4685-90, 4719-38; S. REP.
No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, 19-21, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838,
4844-45, 4855-57; S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-22, 44-55, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4890, 4904-07, 4929-40; H.R. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 267-82,
reprinted in 11974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5049-63; McGILL, supra note 18, at 139-
43; GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 210, at 162-64.
212. Portability was provided in a limited way through the tax-free transfer of pension funds
from a pension plan trust to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) rollover account. 88 Stat.
829, 961 (1974), adding 26 U.S.C. § 408(d) (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 29-30, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670,4696-97; S. REP. No. 127, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4838, 4859-60; S. REP.
No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31,71-78, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4890,
4915-16, 4956-62; H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 341-42, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5121-22.
213. GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 210, at 157. The authors contend that a mobile labor
force is beneficial to the economy and that delayed vesting tends to hold those employees to a job
that an employer least wants to keep while having little effect on retaining the best or most highly
qualified employees. Id at 155-58. But see McGILL, supra note 18, at 21-23, 140-41; Alabama
Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 594 (1977).
214. 431 U.S. at 593-94.
215. GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 210, at 172-75.
216. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL
RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY, PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING (P-H), Report Bulletin 25, § 2, at
52 (March 6, 1981) [hereinafter referred to as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY].
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form of "deferred compensation" 21 7 for socially useful and productive
work, regardless of the length of time spent in the employ of any one
company.2'8
In focusing on vesting requirements, the Court lost sight of the
fundamental issue in the case: whether section 9 of the Military Selec-
tive Service Act 2 19 requires inclusion of Davis' military service in his
"accredited service" for benefit accrual purposes. Vesting was never at
issue in the case because the Alabama Power Co. pension plan counted
military service toward the vesting of accrued benefits. 220 Nor is it per-
suasive to use a substantial vesting requirement as justification for ad-
ditional benefit accruals because there is neither abstract nor practical
reason why the two need bear any relationship at all. Vesting service is
a measure of the period used to determine an employee's nonforfeit-
able right to his accrued benefit; benefit service is a measure of the
accrued benefit itself. The analysis of vesting and benefit accruals in
terms of the Act should involve quite different considerations.
The vesting of pension rights determines eligibility for a pension
benefit in much the same way that shop seniority does for promotion
and for order of lay-off or recall. Viewed this way, vesting is a function
of longevity of employment and, in terms of the Act, approximates
"seniority" 221 or its judicially-created incidents. 222 Therefore, vesting
should be subject to the full protections of the Act and fully guaranteed
to a returning veteran. Vesting enjoys similar legislative protection
under ERISA which, for purposes of minimum vesting standards, re-
quires that vesting service include all "years of service" with an em-
ployer, subject only to certain specified exceptions. 223
217. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4670, 4676-77; S. Rep. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4844-45. Traditionally, pension benefits were considered a form of
deferred compensation. See note 161 and accompanying text supra. See also McGILL, supra note
18, at 20.
218. Seven years after enactment of ERISA, the President's Commission has identified the
same problem areas that gave rise to the minimum vesting standards and portability features of
ERISA. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, supra note 216, at 32-44. See also notes
209-12 and accompanying text supra. The Commission is recommending even shorter vesting
schedules and more portability of benefits.
219. 50 U.S.C. app. § 459 (1970).
220. 431 U.S. at 590.
221. See notes 8-18 and accompanying text supra.
222. See notes 91-152 and accompanying text supra.
223. ERISA broadly defines "vesting service" to include all years of service with an employer
with the following specified exclusions:
(b)(1) In computing the period of service under the plan for purposes of determin-
ing the nonforfeitable percentage under subsection (a)(2) of this section, all of an em-
ployee's years of service with the employer or employers maintaining the plan shall be
taken into account, except that the following may be disregarded:
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On the other hand, benefit accruals, like insurance coverage, vaca-
tion pay and other fringe benefits, compensate an employee for his pro-
ductive work.224 As an element of compensation, benefit accruals, like
wages, can be suspended for periods of absence from the job. The leg-
islative history of the 1940 Act reveals an attempt to preserve accrued
fringe benefits at the point of induction but to require additional accru-
als only upon reemployment. At no point in the debates was it ever
suggested that the Act required an employer to pay wages, provide in-
surance coverage or pension accrual during the period of military serv-
ice.22 5 In terms of the Act, therefore, pension benefit accruals fall
under the category of "insurance and other benefits," which are subject
to employer practices concerning employees on furlough or leave of
absence.226 Similarly, ERISA defers to employer practices in the area
of accrued benefits which, the committee reports indicate, are to be de-
termined under the individual plan, subject only to rules for preventing
discrimination. 227 Benefit service, unlike vesting service, is not defined
in ERISA, and the committee reports note that any reasonable and
consistent basis for its determination will be allowed. 228
Applying a "true nature" of the benefit analysis, the Alabama
Power Court next looked to the benefit formula under the pension plan
and found that it rewarded length of service. Pension benefits under
the plan are determined by using an employee's "monthly earnings"
and "accredited service" as at the date of his retirement. 229 Thus, the
(A) years of service before age 22, except that in case of a plan which does not
satisfy subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2) of this section, the plan may not
disregard any such year of service during which the employee was a participant;
(B) years of service during a period for which the employee declined to con-
tribute to a plan requiring employee contributions;
(C) years of service with an employer during any period for which the em-
ployer did not maintain the plan or a predecessor plan, defined by the Secretary of
the Treasury;
(D) service not required to be taken into account under paragraph (3);
(E) years of service before January 1, 1971, unless the employee has had at
least 3 years of service after December 31, 1970; and
(F) years of service before this part first applies to the plan if such service
would have been disregarded under the rules of the plan with regard to breaks in
service, as in effect on the applicable date.
29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(1) (1976).
224. McGill suggests that pension benefits are a form of "deferred wages" which, like wages,
hospitalization benefits and working conditions, increase employee morale, improve productivity
and enable an employer to keep and attract qualified executives. MCGILL, supra note 18, at 16-23.
225. See notes 36, 37, 39, 45, 47, 50 and accompanying text supra.
226. See notes 8-18 and accompanying text supra.
227. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60-62, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4670, 4726-28.
228. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 268-69, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5038, 5050-51.
229. 431 U.S. at 591 n.15, 594.
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Court reasoned, the benefit formula rewards continuous employment
rather than work actually performed. 230 While the Court's analysis is
not incorrect, it is not at all instructive and results in a misleading
conclusion.
With only slight variations, this same line of reasoning can be pur-
sued to a contrary conclusion: the "true nature" of a pension plan can
be a form of short-term compensation rather than a reward for length
of service. In other words, the "final average pay" formula 23' of the
Alabama Power Co. pension plan could be restated as a "career aver-
age pay" formula232 and the true nature of the plan would not be a
reward for length of service. Under the career average pay approach,
the pension accrual is determined each year as a percentage of that
year's pay.2 33 An employee's accrued benefit at any point in time is
simply the sum of all past one-year accruals. Such a formula would tie
the pension benefit to actual work because the amount of annual ac-
crual would depend on actual pay and service performed that year.
Besides, the employee would enjoy no particular advantage in remain-
ing with an employer, except for the additional one-year accruals. This
"annual compensation" is then deferred so that the employee will enjoy
a retirement income when he is no longer able to work.
Thus, the Court's analysis leads to the curious result that the "true
nature" of a pension plan will vary depending on the statement of its
benefit formula. 234 Of course, it is not possible to analyze the individ-
ual features of any one pension plan and thereby determine the "true
nature" of all pension payments. Nevertheless, by incorporating the
"real nature" test 235 of Accardi v. Pennsylvania Railroad236 into its own
"dual axis" analysis,2 37 the Alabama Power Court required just that.
The "true nature" analysis formulated by the Court is an unworkable
230. Id at 594.
231. See generally MCGILL, supra note 18, at 102-03.
232. Id at 102.
233. The final average formula under the Alabama Power Co. pension plan was 1% of
monthly earnings at retirement date times years of accredited service at such date. The formula
could be expressed in a career average format as 1% of annual earnings for each year of coverage
under the plan.
234. Another kind of defined benefit pension plan formula is the "flat benefit" plan which is
based on the philosophy that, beyond a certain minimum period of service, "retirement benefits
should not be related to service." McGILL, supra note 18, at 104-05. Impliedly, such a plan would
not qualify as a "perquisite of seniority," because the benefit does not depend on the passage of
time in the company's employ. The flat benefit approach further strains at the Court's conclusion
that all pension payments are predominantly rewards for length of service.
235. See notes 110-29 and accompanying text supra.
236. 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
237. 431 U.S. at 589.
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solution to problems of veterans' reemployment rights because it re-
quires a case-by-case determination of a subjective standard that can
lead to conflicting results. 238 The decision provides very little guidance
because it is based on the individual characteristics of the Alabama
Power Co. pension plan and it obscures any notion of how pension
plan benefits fit within the statutory scheme of the 1940 Act.
BEYOND A,4LBAMA POWER Co. v. DAVIS
The "dual axis" analysis formulated by the Supreme Court in Ala-
bama Power Co. v. Davis239 has not yet proven itself a dependable and
workable model for deciding issues of veterans' reemployment rights.
In the first major application of the Alabama Power rationale outside
the realm of pension benefits, two district courts produced conflicting
results, 240 necessitating further refinement by the Supreme Court of the
"true nature" prong of the analysis.24'
The Lower Court Decisions
In claims for pension benefits, the district courts that have relied
on Alabama Power start with the premise that the true nature of pen-
sion benefits is a reward for length of service and then proceed to har-
monize the facts of the case with Alabama Power. It is not surprising,
then, that each court has found Alabama Power determinative of the
issues presented and has ordered credit toward pension plan benefits
for time spent in military service.
In Beckley v. Lipe-Rollway Corp. ,242 the plaintiff was denied
"credited service" for both vesting and benefit accrual purposes be-
cause he failed to complete the requisite 1,750 straight time hours dur-
ing his two-year tour of military duty.243 The defendant argued that
the hour of service approach credits service for work actually per-
formed; thus, the presence of an actual work requirement distinguished
238. The Court thus continues the muddle that arose in the veterans' reemployment rights
cases following the decision in Accardi by preserving the "real nature" test. See notes 145-52 and
accompanying text supra.
239. 431 U.S. 581, 589 (1977).
240. Thornhill v. Ormet Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. 2328 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (SUB payments are "per-
quisites of seniority" for purposes of the Act); Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 461 F. Supp. 344
(N.D. Ohio 1978) (SUB payments are short-term compensation and therefore not "perquisites of
seniority" for purposes of the Act).
241. Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 461 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ohio), affdmem., 590 F.2d 334
(1978), vacated and remanded, 447 U.S. 91 (1980). See SUB Beneltsfor Returning Veterans, supra
note 137, at 510-11.
242. 448 F. Supp. 563 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
243. Id at 564-65.
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the case from Alabama Power where the district court found that "ac-
credited service" did not take into account work actually performed by
an employee. 2 "
The Beckley court found, however, that the "true nature" of the
benefit takes precedence over the formula by which such benefit is cal-
culated. And, since the Supreme Court decision in Alabama Power, the
"true nature of pension payments is a reward for length of service
rather than compensation for services rendered. ' 245 In the Beckley
court's view, the service requirement does not affect the "essential na-
ture" of pension benefits which, as a reward for length of service are
rights of seniority protected by the Act, however calculated. 246
The Beckley court found additional support for its decision 247 in
LaPinta v. Ohio Crankshaft.248 In LaPinta, the district court had
granted summary judgment to the veteran in a set of facts almost iden-
tical to those in Beckley. Prior to Alabama Power, the LaPinta district
court had found that a 1,700 hours of service approach to crediting
service was a bona fide work requirement and, therefore, that the "true
nature" of the pension benefit was a form of compensation. 249 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for reconsidera-
tion in light of Alabama Power and, on remand, the district court
granted the veteran's motion for summary judgment, ordering credit
for military service.
Similarly, two other district courts have found that a compensated
service approach is not so substantive a difference as to defeat a vet-
eran's claim for additional pension credit. The courts in both Turn-
ington v. Standard Register Co. 250 and Horton v. Armour & Co. 251 held
that a 1,700 hours of service requirement does not sufficiently distin-
244. Id at 566. See Davis v. Alabama Power Co., 383 F. Supp. 880, 887 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
The argument that an hours-of-service approach constitutes a "substantial work require-
ment" which thus negates the idea of pension benefits as rewards for length of service was success-
ful in three lower court cases before the Supreme Court decided Alabama Power. Jackson v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 517 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1975); Litwicki v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Indus.,
Inc., 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974); LaPinta v. Ohio Crankshaft, 90 L.R.R.M. 2929 (N.D. Ohio
1975), vacated and remanded, 559 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1977). Of course, because of the district
court's finding in Alabama Power, the issue of a substantial work requirement had not been re-
solved by the Supreme Court opinion. See also notes 153-81 and accompanying text supra.
245. 448 F. Supp. at 566.
246. Id at 566-67.
247. Id at 567.
248. 96 L.R.R.M. 2321(N.D. Ohio), vacated and remanded, 559 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1977).
249. LaPinta v. Ohio Crankshaft, 90 L.R.R.M. 2929 (N.D. Ohio 1975), vacated and remanded,
559 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1977). See notes 168-71 and accompanying text supra.
250. 97 L.R.R.M. 2877 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
251. 84 Lab. Cas. 1 10,640 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
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guish a pension plan from the one in Alabama Power to warrant a dif-
ferent result.
It seems by now fairly well established that collectively bargained
pension benefits are by their nature a perquisite of seniority252 for pur-
poses of the Military Selective Service Act. Thus, in applying the "dual
axis" analysis of Alabama Power, the lower courts have simply relied
on the Supreme Court's determination of the "true nature" of pension
benefits. When it came time for the lower courts to make independent
determinations of the "true nature" of supplemental unemployment
benefits [SUB], however, the results were less than consistent. 253
On remand from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 254 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio reconsidered
Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp. 255 in light of Alabama Power. Using a
real nature of the benefit analysis, the Coffy district court could not
harmonize SUB payments with pension benefits according to the
guidelines established by Alabama Power.
SUB payments, the court found, essentially provide a "wage sub-
stitute" for up to a maximum of fifty-two weeks of unemployment, sup-
plementing state system unemployment benefits. 256 In addition, the
court said, the work requirement is a bona fide effort to relate the SUB
benefits to work actually performed. An employee would build up his
SUB plan credit over a two-year period to provide compensation in the
event of unemployment.2 57 The maximum of fifty-two weeks' benefits
is based on hours actually worked, not time on the payroll, because the
accrual of SUB payments requires more than mere "continued sta-
tus."' 258 Furthermore, the two-year eligibility period for receiving SUB
252. See Bunnell v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 486 F. Supp.
714, 718 (D. Mass. 1980). In Bunnell, the issue was whether a union trust fund was an "employer"
and therefore subject to a district court's jurisdiction under the Act; however, the court first estab-
lished plaintiffs right to receive credit for his military service. Accord, Miller v. White Engines,
Inc., 89 Lab. Cas. 12,192 (6th Cir. 1980), afr'gper curiam, 85 Lab. Cas. 10,947 (N.D. Ohio
1978).
253. The discussion of supplemental unemployment benefits [hereinafter referred to as SUB]
and the cases to follow will be limited to the problems encountered in expanding the "dual axis"
analysis of Alabama Power Co. v. Davis beyond the area of pension benefits. For a full discussion
of the topic of veterans' reemployment rights under SUB plans, see SUB Benefitsfor Returning
Veterans, supra note 137.
254. Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 96 L.R.R.M. 2107 (6th Cir. 1977), vacating and remanding,
90 L.R.R.M. 2901 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
255. 461 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ohio), af'd mem., 590 F.2d 344 (1978), vacated and remanded,
100 S. Ct. 2100 (1980).
256. 461 F. Supp. at 346.
257. Id
258. Id, (quoting Aiello v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 570 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1978) (vacation
pay is a form of short-term compensation for services rendered)).
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payments does not relate the benefits to seniority because the same
minimum applies to all employees; therefore, no advantage results
from long service. Thus, the court concluded, the "true nature" of the
SUB payments sought by plaintiff is a form of "short term compensa-
tion for services rendered" rather than "an aspect of seniority." 259
On the other hand, the district court in Thornhill v. Ormet Corp. 260
came to the opposite conclusion as to the "true nature" of SUB pay-
ments. Although finding a substantial work requirement, 26' the Thorn-
hill court nevertheless saw a sufficient resemblance between SUB
payments and pension benefits to bring the case within the ambit of
Alabama Power. The Thornhill court reasoned that the two-year eligi-
bility requirement for SUB payments, like the vesting period in a pen-
sion plan, was an inducement to remain in the employ of the company
until eligible for benefits.262 In addition, the payment of SUB benefits
induces an employee to wait for recall rather than seek employment
elsewhere. Furthermore, because SUB payments are based on an em-
ployee's hourly rate at the time of lay-off, they resemble other senior-
ity-related fringe benefits like the pension benefit in Alabama Power.
Thus, in its first major application after Alabama Power,263 the
"true nature" of the benefit test produced contrary results in almost
identical factual settings. In what seems the better decision, the Coffy
district court applied the test to SUB payments but found that the bene-
fits had no real relationship to longevity of employment. In light of
controlling precedent, it therefore necessarily follows that SUB benefits
are a form of short-term compensation for work performed and, there-
fore, are not within the purview of the Act. 264 Yet, the Thornhill court
found a strong enough resemblance between SUB payments and pen-
sion benefits to invoke the full protection of the seniority provisions of
the Act. With this split in the decisions, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp. 265 in order to consider the
status of SUB payments.
259. 461 F. Supp. at 346.
260. 99 L.R.R.M. 2328 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
261. Id at 2332.
262. Id at 2331-32.
263. The Alabama Power rationale was applied to vacation pay in Aiello v. Detroit Free Press,
Inc., 570 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1978).
264. 461 F. Supp. at 346. See Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 588-89 (1977);
Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92, 100 (1975).
265. 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
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Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp.
The Supreme Court in Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp. 266 further re-
fined the "true nature" of the benefit test that it had formulated in Ala-
bama Power. According to this refinement, a benefit need not be
"meticulously proportioned" to longevity of service to constitute a
"perquisite of seniority" so long as the benefit "performs a function
akin to traditional forms of seniority."2 67 In other words, a benefit can
be a perquisite of seniority under the Court's analysis even though it is
not based on longevity of service and even though it does not necessar-
ily reward length of service. Such a benefit need only provide some
right traditionally associated with seniority. Applying this sort of anal-
ysis, the Court concluded that:
the purpose and function of the steel industry SUB plan is to provide
economic security during periods of layoff to employees who have
been in the service of the employer for a significant period. Thus, the
benefits are in the nature of a reward for length of service, and do not
represent deferred short-term compensation for services actually ren-
dered. Accordingly, SUB payments are perquisites of seniority to
which returning veterans are entitled under the Act.268
Under the Court's analysis, SUB payments essentially provide ec-
onomic security in the event of lay-off. Traditionally, as one of its
main attributes, seniority also provides protection against lay-off. SUB
payments, therefore, resemble seniority because they provide a "sec-
ond-level protection" against lay-off.2 6 9 In this sense, the Court rea-
soned, SUB payments, like the severance pay inAccardi,2 70 compensate
an employee for the loss of his job.
On the contrary, it can be argued that SUB payments bear an in-
verse relationship to seniority: the need for SUB payments decreases as
seniority increases. In fact, SUB payments may often provide protec-
tion for those employees who have the lowest seniority because they are
the first employees to be placed on lay-off status. 27' It is only in the
most superficial sense that SUB payments resemble the severance pay
of Accardi. In Accardi, severance pay was tied to longevity of service
because the more seniority one had, the more he would forfeit by way
of accrued rights and benefits. 272 In addition, the severance pay
266. 447 U.S. 191 (1980).
267. Id at 205.
268. Id at 205-06.
269. Id at 200.
270. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225, 230 (1966). See notes 114-24 and accompa-
nying text supra.
271. See SUB Benefitsfor Returning Veterans, supra note 137, at 521-22.
272. See notes 122-24 and accompanying text supra.
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formula in Accardi was a function of "compensated service" and pro-
duced the greatest amount of severance pay for the most senior em-
ployees.273 It would hardly seem that, in any meaningful sense, SUB
payments are "analogous" to severance pay.
The Coffy Court disagreed with the district court's finding of a
substantial work requirement for SUB plan payments and its determi-
nation that the fifty-two week maximum on SUB payments negated the
notion of reward for length of service. 274 The Court responded by
showing that each argument raised by the district court could also sup-
port its contrary conclusion that SUB payments are not short-term
compensation for services rendered. 275 Far from invalidating the dis-
trict court's reasoning, such an admission by the Supreme Court merely
underscores the ineffectiveness of a mode of analysis which will not
produce logically consistent results when applied in new situations. It
does not seem reasonable that a weekly supplement to state unemploy-
ment compensation that accrues fully in just two years and produces a
maximum of fifty-two payments is the type of seniority right that Con-
gress intended to guarantee a veteran inducted into the armed forces.
Nevertheless, the "true nature" of the benefit analysis, formulated by
the Court in Alabama Power and refined by the Court in Coffy, will
produce just such a result.
The Future of the Alabama Power Rationale
The Supreme Court's wide-ranging conclusion in Alabama Power
Co. v. Davi 276 belies the potentially limited field of its application.
Fundamental to the Alabama Power decision, and indeed to each ma-
jor veterans' reemployment rights decision, is the presence of a collec-
tively bargained seniority system that brings a veteran's claim for
additional pension credit directly within the purview of the Act.277 The
273. 383 U.S. at 227-28.
274. 447 U.S. at 202-05.
275. Id at 205.
276. The Court "concludes ... that pension payments are predominantly rewards for contin-
uous employment with the same employer." 431 U.S. at 594.
277. Although decided factually on the basis of seniority and seniority systems, the decisions
leave open their possible application in non-bargained situations:
Congress recognized in the Act the existence of seniority systems and seniority
rights. It sought to preserve the veteran's rights under those systems and to protect him
against loss under them by reason of his absence. There is indeed no suggestion that
Congress sought to sweep aside the seniority system. What it undertook was to give the
veteran protection within the framework of the seniority system. . ..
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 288 (1946);
However, § 9(c) does not guarantee the returning serviceman a perfect reproduction
of the civilian employment that might have been his if he had not been called to the
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"dual axis" analysis of Alabama Power, as refined by Coffy, must pre-
suppose a system of seniority in order to determine whether a right or
benefit is a perquisite of seniority. 278 Thus, the question arises whether
Alabama Power and Coffy have any application to those situations in
which no bargained-for system of seniority exists. In this sense, at
least, it surely cannot be said with any degree of certainty that all pen-
sion payments are perquisites of seniority.
Moreover, the Alabama Power Court expressly declined to com-
ment on the issue of whether defined contribution plans would be
treated differently from defined benefit plans under the Military Selec-
tive Service Act.279 Under a defined contribution plan, an employer
(either alone or in conjunction with an employee) makes annual contri-
butions to the employee's individual account under the plan on the ba-
sis of a certain percentage of the employee's annual compensation. 280
Such contributions receive favorable, tax-deductible treatment under
the Internal Revenue Code only if they are based on "compensation
otherwise paid or accrued." 281 Thus, even if an employer desired to
colors .... Its very important but limited purpose is to assure that those changes and
advancements in status that would necessarily have occurred simply by virtue of contin-
ued employment will not be denied the veteran because of his absence in the military
service.
McKinney v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 357 U.S. 265, 273 (1958);
So construed, we conclude that Congress intended a reemployed veteran, who, upon
returning from military service, satisfactorily completes his interrupted training, to enjoy
the seniority status which he would have acquired by virtue of continued employment
but for his absence in military service.
Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169, 181 (1964);
The term "seniority" is nowhere defined in the Act, but it derives its content from
private employment practices and agreements. . . . The term "seniority" is not to be
limited by a narrow, technical definition but must be given a meaning that is consonant
with the intent of Congress as expressed in the 1940 Act. That intention was to preserve
for the returning veteran the rights and benefits which would have automatically accrued
to them had they remained in private employment rather than responding to the call of
their country.
Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1966).
In light of what the Court has said in the above-quoted passages, "continuous employment"
might serve as a substitute for "seniority" in contexts where there is no collectively bargained
definition of seniority; however, "continuous employment" has neither the import nor statutory
proportions of the term "seniority."
278. The "dual axis" analysis is nothing more than an amalgamation of the "reasonable cer-
tainty" standard of McKinney and Ti/ion with the "real nature" test ofAccard" and Foster. Ala-
bama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584-89 (1977); see notes 69-152 and accompanying text
supra.
279. 431 U.S. at 594 n.18.
280. See general, MCGILL, supra note 18, at 95-101, 586-87.
281. 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(3) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-9 (1980). The favorable tax treat-
ment provided "qualified" retirement plans has been cited as a major factor influencing the
growth of the private pension plan movement. Moreover, the tax advantages of "qualification"
continue to provide a strong incentive for the establishment and maintenance of "qualified" plans.
See McGu.L, supra note 18, at 23-26, 584-85.
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continue making contributions to an employee's individual account
during his period of military service, such contributions would not
qualify for tax-deductibility and could jeopardize the "qualified" sta-
tus 2 8 2 of the defined contribution plan unless the employee had "com-
pensation otherwise paid or accrued." In other words, such
contributions could not be made on the basis of imputed compensation
at the inductee's last regular rate.283 Therefore, at least in the case of
defined contribution plans, 284 the courts find themselves on the horns
of a dilemma: they are to construe the Act liberally for the benefit of
the returning veteran 285 and yet such a liberal construction could run
afoul of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the sweeping language of the Alabama Power
Court, the current state of the law concerning veterans' reemployment
rights to retirement benefits is far from settled. During the 1980's, the
vast majority of veterans of World War II will attain normal or early
retirement age under private sector retirement plans.286 At present,
only that class of veterans covered under defined benefit plans operated
282. Generally speaking, a "qualified" plan is one which meets the requirements of §§ 401,
410 and 411 of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401, 410 and 411 (1976). Qualified status
carries with it certain tax advantages and, in the words of McGill, "is highly prized and earnestly
sought." McGILL, supra note 18, at 25. The tax advantages of "qualified" plans include the
following: (i) employer contributions are deductible within certain limits for federal income tax
purposes as ordinary and necessary business expense, 26 U.S.C. §§ 404(a), 404(a)(i), (3) and (7)
(1976); (ii) employer contributions to a qualified plan are not includible in the taxable income of
participants until actually received, 26 U.S.C. § 402(a)(i) (1976); (iii) investment earnings on plan
assets held by a qualified trust-including realized gains and losses-are not taxable for federal
income tax purposes until disbursed to participants in the form of plan benefits, 26 U.S.C. §§ 501,
511-514 (1976); (iv) "lump-sum distributions" to plan participants qualify for favorable capital
gains treatment and "Special 10-year Averaging" for federal income tax purposes, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 402(a)(2) and (e) (1976); (v) the amount of plan benefits payable to beneficiaries other than the
deceased participant's probate estate which are attributable to employer contributions are ex-
cluded from the deceased participant's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, 26 U.S.C.
§ 2039(c) (1976); and (vi) a plan participant's election or exercise of an option to make a plan
benefit payable to a beneficiary after his death is not deemed to be a "transfer" for federal gift tax
purposes, 26 U.S.C. § 2517 (1976). See generally McGILL, supra note 18, at 25-26, 584-601.
283. But see VETERANS' HANDBOOK, supra note 128, at 95-104.
284. Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584 (1977); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock &
Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).
285. A similar problem might arise in the defined benefit area under a career average pay plan
because such plan bases benefit accruals on a certain percentage of each year's pay. In that case,
however, the use of last regular rate of pay as a basis for determining benefits of inductees can be
justified on analogy with providing "past service benefits"--that is, benefits for the period prior to
the plan's inception-by using last regular rate of pay. In the defined benefit area, there is no
similar requirement that benefits be based on "compensation otherwise paid or accrued" as there
is in the defined contribution area. See McGILL, supra note 18, at 101-02; 26 U.S.C. §§ 404(a)(1)
and (a)(3) (1976).
286. See McGILL, supra note 18, at 113-19.
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within a collectively bargained seniority system are guaranteed pension
credit for military service. In this sense, at least, Alabama Power be-
comes important for what it does not hold because the limit of its hold-
ing determines the classes of veterans who do not have a guaranteed
claim under the Act.
Of course, it is not equitable to deny a veteran's claim for addi-
tional pension credit merely because he happened to work a white col-
lar job or because his employer happened to maintain a defined
contribution plan. Such a veteran served his country no less than a
veteran covered by a collective bargaining agreement. However, in the
absence of legislative action, the courts would have to expand in piece-
meal fashion the rationale of Alabama Power to include, first, non-bar-
gained plans and, then, defined contribution plans. As for the latter,
the courts would have no small difficulty side-stepping the limitations
of the Internal Revenue Code.
Recognizing the inherent limitations of the judicial process which
decides issues on a case-by-case basis, Congress must act to insure
equal and equitable treatment of veterans' claims. Pension benefits
should be identified either as an instance of "other benefits," guaran-
teed only to the extent of employer practices pertaining to leave of ab-
sence, or elevated to the same status as "seniority." At least then,
veterans, employers and the courts will know how to proceed in this
now unsettled area.
STEPHEN D. TANDLE

